

THE ARAB SPRING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE REGION, THE UNITED STATES,
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

by
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A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies.

Baltimore, Maryland
May, 2014

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ABSTRACT

The Arab Spring has fundamentally altered the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The regional revolution saw regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and civil wars in Libya and, at the time of writing this, ongoing in Syria. This thesis explores several dimensions of domestic and international politics related to the Arab Spring. Specifically, it evaluates the implications that the Arab Spring has had for selected Arab countries' security relationships with the United States, how the Arab Spring has shed light on the doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect," and the role of nonviolent civil resistance in outcomes in Libya.

In examining the Arab Spring's preliminary consequences, this thesis provides an initial understanding of how the revolutions affect the United States and challenge international norms. Each chapter uses a different method to come to its conclusion. To assess the effects of the Arab Spring on the U.S. security relationship with the MENA countries which did not experience regime change, two factors are applied: the country's choice to adhere to public opinion and the influence of the shared threat with the United States. The chapter finds that among other things, a perceived common threat will continue to ensure a strong security relationship with the United States. The Arab Spring's implications for "Responsibility to Protect" are determined by using the UN's criteria for intervention and applying it in a comparison to the conflicts in Libya, where intervention was approved, and in Syria where the conflict continues. It is determined that the Syrian conflict does not meet the criteria for intervention due to the overriding interests of UNSC members. To evaluate the effectiveness of civil resistance, or nonviolent conflict, in Libya – where it was overshadowed by a violent civil war – effective strategies of civil resistance are applied to the movements present during the

conflict. Civil resistance in Libya was effective and played a supporting role during the conflict to oust Qadhafi.

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INTRODUCTION

The Arab Spring is a regional populist revolution that has changed political dynamics throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It began in 2010 and still continues in one form or another, whether in continued violent conflict or continual regime change due to an uncertain citizenry. The populations took to the streets, largely nonviolently, to call for an end to authoritarian rule and corruption. While the initial uprisings began in December 2010 in Tunisia, in the coming months they spread to Egypt, Libya, and throughout the region. All countries in the region felt the effects of the Arab Spring.

For the foreseeable future the MENA region will remain of strategic importance to the United States due to vital national security interests, namely the free flow of resources, defense against the threat of terrorism, and the concern for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹ Most of the authoritarian regimes in the region were long-time allies of the United States, and as such, were relied on to maintain stability in what was otherwise a volatile region. The overthrow of these regimes has left security and power vacuums that threaten the stability of their neighbors. The Arab Spring has altered the status quo in the region, creating implications for the relationships the United States has historically held within the MENA region.

The Arab Spring is a fairly recent occurrence, and is largely unfinished. Its effects on the international community may not be fully comprehended for years to come, but we can examine its immediate impacts on certain significant political dynamics.

¹ Miles, Donna, "Centcom Chief: Middle East Decisions Will Have Wide Impact," American Forces Press Service, U.S. Department of Defense (Oct 22, 2013) <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120989> (accessed 9March2014).

Specifically, this thesis will examine 1) the initial effects the Arab Spring has had on historic U.S. security relationships, 2) implications for the relatively new notion in international governance of the “Responsibility to Protect,” and 3) the role of strategic nonviolence in the overthrow of a dictatorship through analysis of events in the countries affected by the uprisings.

The first chapter examines the question of how the Arab Spring has affected security relationships between the United States and MENA countries that did not experience regime change, which were the monarchies. The monarchies in question are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar), Jordan, and Morocco. These countries experienced some unrest during the Arab Spring, but not to the extent of other MENA countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. For decades the monarchies have enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. The United States has provided security assistance in the form of training, funding, exercises, etc. and in return the countries in question have provided military basing, support in military operations, and assistance in containing transnational terrorism.

Ultimately, the security relationship between the United States and the monarchies tend to change very little as long as the current regime stays in power. The Arab Spring has created uncertainty, and the MENA kingdoms are unlikely to distance themselves from a willing security partner. Additionally, the strategic importance of the MENA makes it important for the United States to maintain the status quo. The chapter arrives at this conclusion by analyzing two factors that could alter a security relationship: public opinion and a common threat.

The Arab Spring changed the dynamic of public opinion in the MENA region. Prior to the unrest, the people's voice mattered little; however, the revolution showed that the people could dictate the direction of the government and, in extreme cases, the government could be overthrown. The monarchies recognized this possibility and have made concessions to the public in order to prevent further unrest. The United States has been an ally to many of the authoritarian regimes in the region, and as the people call for national change, there is the potential that new or appeasing leadership could alter questionable alliances. A threat common to two parties is essential for a security relationship. In this case, the common threat is the expanding reach of Iran and transnational terrorism.

The case studies test these theories using Jordan and Bahrain, countries that are both strategically important to the United States and experienced substantial unrest due to the uprisings. This chapter examines the role of security cooperation in each country. It also analyzes the concessions made by the regimes in order to appease the public and the status of the common threat between the United States and both countries.

The second chapter examines the emerging international norm called "Responsibility to Protect," its status after the multi-state intervention in Libya in 2011, and its absence in the ongoing Syrian civil war. It poses the question: if "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) was used to justify the intervention in Libya, why does the concept not compel intervention in Syria? The answer to this question is determined by using Libya as the model for R2P and comparing and contrasting the two conflicts using the United Nation's Three Pillars of R2P, and then employing the proposed six criteria for R2P as a "checklist" to determine whether intervention would be appropriate in the Syrian case.

The six criteria are: Just Cause, Right Intention, Last Resort, Legitimate Authority, Proportional Means, and Reasonable Prospect. With these criteria in mind, the difference between the two conflicts, Libya and Syria, is that while Libya met the criteria for R2P, Syria lacks Legitimate Authority, Reasonable Prospect, and Right Intention making intervention inappropriate.

The encompassing argument against R2P is that it is a breach of sovereignty in order to further the interests of the intervening party. The members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) did not have any overriding national interests in Libya so they had no reason to object to intervention. However in Syria, Russia, a member of the UNSC, does have interests which resulted in their objection to intervention. The objection from the UNSC eliminates the criterion of Legitimate Authority. Additionally, the criterion Reasonable Prospect is lacking. The Syrian opposition is fractured, resulting in no government to replace the al-Asad regime if he were to be overthrown. In contrast, the Libyan opposition was fairly unified and had an interim government in place to quickly take over governance. The Syrian regime also enjoys external support from Iran and Russia, while the Libyan regime was isolated. Intervention may cause more harm than good. The North American Treaty Organization (NATO) stretched the Right Intention criterion in Libya by expanding the mission of establishing a no-fly-zone to enabling regime change. This will make it difficult to convince the UNSC that regime change would not be the purpose of armed humanitarian intervention in Syria, making the Right Intention criterion questionable.

This chapter ultimately demonstrates a failure of the concept of R2P and the selective nature of humanitarian intervention. The purpose of R2P is to give the United

Nations a mechanism to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It is intended to enable the international community to intervene in such instances, despite national interests and bias. The failure of the UNSC to approve action in Syria is essentially a failure of R2P.

The third chapter examines strategic nonviolence during the Arab Spring, specifically in Libya. The uprising in Libya began in a similar vein as Tunisia and Egypt, with mass demonstrations that were largely nonviolent. However, in the case of Libya the uprising quickly turned violent and resulted in a bloody civil war. This chapter explores the question of the effectiveness of Libyan civil resistance in the overthrow of Qadhafi and subsequent transition to democracy.

Using strategies and methods that were developed by activist scholars, particularly Gene Sharp, the chapter determines that the civil resistance groups active during the conflict were instrumental in the fall of the regime, particularly in attacking and defeating two elements of Qadhafi's perceived sources of power, which were the control of the media and the loyalty of Tripoli. Without these two foundations, Qadhafi would lose the narrative that he was in control of the country and was fighting a legitimate battle against terrorists and foreign invaders. Civil resistance revolves around the idea that leadership, whether dictatorship or not, requires the obedience of the people in order to stay in power. Once that obedience is withdrawn the regime starts to lose legitimacy.

Libyan civil resistance also has had a democratizing effect on the population, by allowing all walks of life to participate in resistance and to have a voice in governance. A purely violent conflict is generally selective in who can join, selecting those who have

some ability. On the other hand, civil resistance allows and encourages mass participation, whether it is protesting, non-cooperation, or civil disobedience. Civil resistance after the initial conflict was instrumental in holding the interim government accountable for its actions, disbanding some militias, and educating the population on how to vote.

CHAPTER 1: Security Cooperation Post Arab Spring: Maintaining the Status-Quo in the Kingdoms

Following World War II, the United States developed strategic relationships with countries in the Middle East to contain communism and secure the flow of oil. Over time, the purpose for these relationships evolved from containing communism to containing Islamic extremism and the looming threat of Iran in order to maintain the stability of the region. It is in the United States' best interest to preserve the status quo in the region, and, oftentimes, that requires a relationship with a long lasting dictatorship or hereditary monarchy.

The phenomenon of the Arab Spring affected all countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Long established authoritarian regimes were forced to meet the demands of their people. There was forced regime change in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, as well as an ongoing conflict in Syria with regime change as the declared end-state of the opposition.² The other countries of the region, primarily the Arab monarchies, have temporarily placated their populations with economic and political reform. In a region where public opinion hasn't been the priority of the governments, it now matters. This brings into question the status of U.S. influence and standing in the region, particularly in terms of security cooperation. The United States has never been popular in the Middle East, but now old alliances are a liability and a cause of suspicion for the populations who have just discovered the power of public will.

² Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, "Syrian Opposition to Shun Peace Talks Unless Assad Exit is Goal," *Reuters*, Oct 22, 2013, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/22/uk-syria-crisis-geneva-idUKBRE99L0LE20131022> (accessed 22 March 2014).

This chapter will analyze the effects of the Arab Spring on the security relationships between the United States and the countries that have made concessions to appease their restless populations, leaving their regimes intact; specifically, Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.³ An important similarity of these countries is that they are all monarchies and most are major producers of oil. The governments of the GCC, Jordan, and Morocco met selected demands of their populations to stop the uprisings before they got out of hand. This might be perceived as weakness domestically and externally, as people recognize they have the ability to force their opinion to be heard, which, as seen in neighboring countries, they will likely do so until their demands are met.

The rise of popular power could lead to change in foreign policy as well as domestic principles, as governments compromise traditional national relationships to meet their populace's demands. It is possible that countries in the region will distance themselves from the United States in order to improve their standing with the newly formed governments in the region and with their own citizenry. Less likely, but also possible, governments in MENA could move closer to the U.S. out of fear and uncertainty of what the transitioning regional governments represent. There is also bound to be a sense of suspicion and anxiety in regards to U.S. policy now that the United States has abandoned its alliances with countries like Egypt.

³ Israel, while also a regional actor and a recipient of U.S. security cooperation, will not be included in this assessment. The scope of this chapter is about countries which may yet succumb to a revolutionary moment and have experienced unrest due to the Arab Spring. Israel has remained relatively stable and is unlikely to fall due to a popular uprising.

In order to determine the impact of the Arab Spring on security cooperation in the region, I must first ensure a common understanding of security cooperation and then examine its purpose and importance to the United States in the Middle East. Next, I will identify the changes that have occurred because of the Arab Spring uprisings and how they may impact the security partnerships, specifically with traditional allies. I have identified two factors that have the potential of changing a strategic relationship. The first pertains to the question of public opinion at a domestic level; are the demands of the people being heard by their governments and are the governments feeling pressure to meet those demands? The second factor consists of the common threats, real or perceived, that are shared between the United States and the country in question. Has the Arab Spring changed these threats? For the purposes of my analysis, these two factors will be applied to two strategically important countries: Bahrain and Jordan.

It should be noted, that while recognizing that other factors may have an influence on existing security relationships, the focus of this chapter is the effects and potential effects of the Arab Spring on the existing security cooperation between the impacted countries and the United States. The U.S. drawdown and the pivot, the change in national priorities, may change relationships, but it is not the intent of this chapter to discuss this as the reason for change. I also believe that the Middle East will remain strategically important as long as the United States is reliant on its oil, transnational terrorism is a threat, and Iran remains a threat.

Security Cooperation

Security cooperation should not be confused with *cooperative security*.

Cooperative security is a term that defines “an obligation of member states to

defend...states within a group of treaty signatories,”⁴ such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO also serves as a good example of a *security community*, a concept which is also *not* being examined in this chapter. Security communities, as defined by Karl Deutsch, are a grouping of states that regardless the conflict will not go to war with each other. Security cooperation on the other hand, is a blanket term that encompasses all U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department interaction with a foreign government’s defense sector. Security assistance, a more common term, falls under this category. For the purpose of this chapter, the terms security cooperation and security assistance will be used interchangeably.

Security cooperation is one of the primary functions of U.S. foreign policy, conducted to meet national security objectives simultaneously. It is a function of the DoD in coordination with the Department of State.⁵ Security cooperation is defined in multiple military manuals that are derived from the *National Security Strategy*.⁶ *Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5132.03* assigns responsibility across the DoD for the execution and planning of security cooperation among the military geographic combatant commands. *DoDD 5132.03* and *Joint Publication 3.0* provide the widely accepted definition of security cooperation as:

Activities undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense

⁴ Cohen, Richard, Mihalka, Michael, “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order,” The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, *The Marshall Center Papers*, No. 3, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_3-en.pdf (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁵ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “DSCA Overview,” http://www.dsca.mil/about_us.htm (accessed 21 Oct 2012).

⁶ National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 20 Oct 2012).

and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.⁷

There are multiple programs within security cooperation that the U.S. offers or a country can request. They involve training, weapons sales, combined operations, funding, and anti-terrorism assistance and include: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Bi-lateral agreements and base leases are also parts of security cooperation.

The former U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander, General James Mattis, articulates the most contemporary and comprehensive look at security cooperation in the Middle East in his 2012 statement on the posture of USCENTCOM, presented to the House Armed Service Committee. General Mattis cites the strategic importance of the region primarily due to its large reserves of oil, thus making regional stability important to all parties. He offers three major threats to stability: al-Qaeda and its affiliates,⁸ the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iran. USCENTCOM's strategic approach to the region can be summed up with a single statement: "we will advance our strategic objectives through a *tailored approach* by seeking a *nexus of common interests and*

⁷ Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, Oct 2008, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/513203p.pdf> (accessed 21 Oct 2012).

⁸ Affiliates in this sense would include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and various other groups that claim affiliation with al-Qaeda

identifying common ground with partners that puts [the U.S.] on a trajectory for shared, long-term benefit.”⁹

Stability in the Middle East has been the priority of the United States after 9/11 and the purpose of the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. General Mattis states that the strategic importance of the Middle East lies in its vast oil reserves, and this is the primary reason that stability of the region is in the interest of the U.S. A secondary interest is to contain Islamic extremism. One of the historic components of stability in the region has been the existence of authoritarian regimes.

Derek S. Reveron explains the importance of cooperation in the Middle East in his article “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence Sharing in the War on Terror.” He emphasizes the importance of developing security relationships to combat trans-national terrorism. Of most importance is developing relationships with governments in the Middle East, where most terrorists originate. Reveron notes that it takes a common threat – the second factor which influences a strategic relationship - to develop those partnerships; in the case of the Middle East the most obvious and immediate threat is trans-national terrorism. Enabling another country to defend itself is beneficial for both countries. On one hand, the United States doesn’t need to commit large forces to the area, and on the other hand, the recipient nation maintains its sovereignty while developing its military capability.

A different perspective on the potential of security assistance in the Middle East is offered by Kenneth McKenzie and Elizabeth Packard’s recent article “Enduring Interests

⁹ Mattis, James N. General, “Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps Commander U.S. Central Command Before the House Armed Service Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, Mar 2012, p 11 <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Mattis%2003-06-12.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring.” In this commentary they explain the importance of security assistance and the military engagements especially during and after the Arab Spring. They essentially argue that the relationships that were built through security cooperation programs before the Arab Spring have and will be the enduring factor in helping the U.S. “respond effectively to...reform movements while continuing to ensure regional security and stability.”¹⁰

Security assistance gives the U.S. the opportunity to develop credibility and influence in the region. The U.S. can develop friendly regional powers through the selective amount of security assistance it provides. Successful partnerships provide the United States a foothold in the Middle East. For instance, the U.S. military maintains key bases in Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman to exercise influence in the region. Additionally, weapons and equipment are prepositioned in some of these countries to secure future U.S. interests.¹¹ If these countries were to change their security relationship with the United States, U.S. strategic goals would necessarily need to be re-worked. One of the key questions that must be answered is: what are the factors that would alter a security partnership?

Changing a Security Partnership

As previously identified, public opinion within the country receiving security cooperation and a common threat with the United States are two of the major factors that would likely change a security partnership. In the following sections I will describe these

¹⁰ McKenzie, Kenneth, Packard, Elizabeth, “Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring,” *Prism* 3, No. 1, p 99

¹¹ Reveron, Derek S., “Weak States and Security Assistance,” *Prism* 1, No. 3, Georgetown University Press (2010), p 30, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/weak-states.html> (accessed 20 Oct 2012).

two factors and evaluate how the regional unrest could potentially impact security cooperation.

Public Opinion: The U.S. has supported authoritarian regimes in the MENA region in order to safe-guard the status quo. Mahmood Monshipouri and Ali Assareh explain in their article “The New Middle East and the United States: What to Expect After the Uprisings?” that the policy of the United States has been to protect the flow of oil, support Israel and pro-Western authoritarian regimes, and deter and contain the Islamic threat. This has been accomplished by supporting the regimes with security assistance and economic aid. In making the decision to back the authoritarian regimes, the U.S. has often turned a blind eye to human rights violations. The U.S. has supported the regimes out of fear that supporting the people and, in extent, democracy (freedom for the people to choose their own governments), would allow anti-American Islamist regimes to come to power.¹² Now that the Arab Spring uprisings have taken place, the United States has made another choice, and to focus its political support behind the popular uprisings in countries, like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, while supporting the governments of the GCC, Jordan and Morocco.

In his article “U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?” former Ambassador Dennis Jett argues that militarily supporting a repressive regime may be counterproductive. Supporting a repressive regime to fight terrorism may have the short term effect of isolating the terrorists in that country, but will likely alienate the population and ultimately create more enemies of the United States. Jett proposes that building the capacity of the government, encouraging democracy, and

¹² Monshipouri, Mahmood, Assareh, Ali, “The New Middle East and the United States: What to Expect After the Uprisings?” *Insight Turkey* Vol 13 No. 3 (2011) p 122.

human rights would have long-term results, whereas introducing enhanced military capabilities, although useful and necessary, would only be a short-term solution.¹³

At the time Jett was writing his article, the unrest of the Arab Spring was ongoing in Egypt. Egypt, under a repressive government, enjoyed much security assistance from the United States. Jett compares Egypt to Iran under the Shah and warns, “close relationships with dictators can provide short-term stability but prove to be long-term disasters.”¹⁴ In other words, the United States propping up regimes across the region to maintain the status quo has failed to address the way those governments were governing. Now, if the people were able to achieve a “democratic solution” they may see the United States as part of the problem. After the Arab Spring and the “democracy” that it brought with it, the alienation of the population that resulted from U.S. assistance to authoritarian regimes may negatively affect the relationship that country is willing to have with the United States.

Public opinion has the potential of impacting a nation’s foreign policy or affecting its choice of allies. Daniel Byman discusses this powerful role of public opinion in shaping a nation’s foreign policy in his article “Regime Changes in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects.” Public opinion is a force to be reckoned with and Islamists have the potential of taking a more prominent role on the political scene. He states that before the Arab Spring public opinion mattered little. Byman uses the example of Jordan and Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel, made against the general will of the people. In comparison, today, even in the countries that witnessed limited unrest, like the GCC

¹³ Jett, Dennis, “U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?” *Middle East Policy* (Spring 2011), p 86.

¹⁴ Ibid

countries and Jordan, governments are listening to public opinion, as can be seen in the concessions that they made to bring calm.

Another major transformation is that new regimes are instituting Islamic Law in their constitutions and Islamic political groups are gaining more clout. It is likely that they will look critically at the former regime's ties to the West. This differs with countries in the GCC, Jordan, and Morocco, where political parties are outlawed or have only notional opportunities and the monarchies already have religious credibility. Byman states that even "regimes that withstood the Arab Spring, the lack of elections...damage their claim to rule with the support of their people."¹⁵ Popular support will also dictate whom the government can or will support. For example, if popular sympathy is for the opposition of Yemen then the government will find it difficult to support the repression even if they were longtime supporters of the regime.¹⁶

These new governments or newly appointed leaders will not necessarily be friendly to the West. They may seek to distance themselves from the United States to maintain their fragile popular support. The growing power of popular opinion means future partnerships will not be as they were. New political players, specifically the Islamists, see the U.S. as complacent and supportive of the former repressive regimes.¹⁷ Accepting U.S. support could be seen as suspicious to constituents.¹⁸ The governments/monarchies of the GCC, Jordan, and Morocco have remained the same,

¹⁵ Byman, Daniel, "Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects," *Political Science Quarterly* Vol.127 No 1 (2012) p 32.

¹⁶ Ibid p 34

¹⁷ Ibid p 37

¹⁸ Ibid p 46

however the pressure of the people for change may cause them to alter their policies in order to appear authentically Islamic and thus maintain their legitimacy.

Public opinion is hugely influential in a country adjusting an existing partnership with the U.S. This wasn't a factor before the Arab Spring due to the authoritarian nature of the governments. Now, post-revolution, the governments of the Middle East, whether changed or not, have more respect for the opinions of the people. "Arab Spring...American Fall?" Emma Sky's article for the *Harvard International Review*, discusses U.S. policy in the Middle East. She explains that the United States has supported the regimes that abused their people by building the capacity of their militaries, the primary tool of oppression. The people recognize this and are suspicious of U.S. intentions in the region post-Arab Spring.

Sky explains that the Arab Spring will likely "result in Arab public opinion mattering more."¹⁹ The new leaders and monarchies will have to be more sensitive to the will of their people. She suggests that public opinion will influence the will of the government in relations to U.S. policy. In contrast, in the article "Swords into Ploughshares: The Effect of Pacifist Public Opinion on Foreign Policy in Western Democracies," William Davis makes the argument that in democratic governments a leader is more inclined to ignore public opinion if the state is threatened, and vice versa, during times of reduced threat.²⁰ The Middle East isn't the variable that Davis was working with as he wrote, but his argument may be applied to transitioning governments that use the West as a model.

¹⁹ Sky, Emma, "Arab Spring...American Fall?" *Harvard International Review* (Summer 2011), p 27.

²⁰ Davis, William, "Swords into Ploughshares: The Effect of Pacifist Public Opinion on Foreign Policy in Western Democracies," *Cooperation and Conflict* 47 (3) (2012), p 313, <http://cac.sagepub.com/content/47/3/309> (accessed 18 Oct 2012).

Like Davis, in their study, “Security Status: Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and its Limits in the Middle East,” Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye argue that domestic politics do influence foreign policy, especially in the case of those regime’s facing serious threats to their survival. They describe the “search for authenticity” in the guise of secular leaders in constant conflict with Islamist political coalitions.²¹ Also, ethnic or religiously led governments are more likely to “pursue confrontational policies towards their regional neighbors because cooperation would undermine their legitimacy and threaten their domestic support.”²²

The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Jordan, and Morocco, are pro-Western monarchies with a unique position in the region. They have largely remained intact after the Arab Spring. Their populations are now looking outward to countries like Egypt and Libya who have revamped their governments; their populace may be encouraged to follow suit. The “search for authenticity” as previously mentioned, may come into play, especially after regional powers have taken on a more Islamic focused government. Similar governments will dampen their pro-Western leanings in order to remain legitimate in the Arab world.

Taking these factors into account, it is likely that the Gulf Cooperation Council monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, although affected by the Arab Spring, will establish closer ties to the United States in the realm of security to protect against external threats, while publicly criticizing U.S. policy in the region to appease their populations. These countries support each other and while the regimes/Kings remain in power, foreign policy

²¹ Jentleson, Bruce W., Kaye, Dalia Dassa, “Security Status: Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and its Limits in the Middle East,” *Security Studies*, 8:1, p 210, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419808429369> (accessed 16 Oct 2012).

²² Ibid., p 21

will most likely not change. Security cooperation with the U.S. is a valuable asset to regional governments, and the Arab Spring has created too much uncertainty for them to distance themselves from a willing security partner that has vital interests in the region. To date, the monarchies were mostly successful in buying off their population with limited economic and political reform.

Common Threat: The *National Security Strategy* and the DoD's *Quadrennial Defense Report* both explain the importance of security cooperation and partnership building in order to meet the security demands of the 21st Century. Both documents warn that the United States cannot fight global terrorism or create a stable Middle East alone. The military capacity of regional countries must be enhanced for them to act without a sustained U.S. presence. The *National Security Strategy* states that security cooperation has the ability to prevent future conflicts by modernizing a nation's capabilities and capacity to meet a common threat.²³

A common threat is essential for a country to accept U.S. security assistance, or for that matter the United States offering assistance. As mentioned previously, the United States' view three major threats to regional stability: trans-national terrorism, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁴ For the GCC countries, Morocco, and Jordan, two of the threats shared with the United States are Iran and trans-national terrorism, specifically al-Qaeda and its affiliates, which are regional al-Qaeda franchises, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Iran poses a looming threat to the Sunni elite in the Gulf Cooperation

²³ National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010, pp 24-25, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 20 Oct 2012).

²⁴ Mattis, James N. General, "Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps Commander U.S. Central Command Before the House Armed Service Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, Mar 2012, p 11 <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statement/2012/03%20March/Mattis%2003-06-12.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

Council countries, Jordan and Morocco, as they perceive it as having a malicious influence on their Shia populations. As can be seen during the Arab Spring, when the Shia population was protesting in Bahrain, the regime was quick to blame it on Iranian interference.²⁵

The “democratization” of the Arab Spring was not good for al-Qaeda interests.²⁶ An unintentional effect of the Arab Spring uprisings may have caused al-Qaeda to turn its attention to the repressive Arab monarchies. One of its many targets is pro-Western governments that repress their people, but during the Arab Spring, the people were able to have their way, forcing their governments to change, taking away al-Qaeda leverage. However, the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco, are still pro-Western, their regimes still intact, and they’re still controlling their people. Al-Qaeda remains a threat to these countries, and this threat will cause them to maintain their security relationship with the United States, which is seen as the best guarantor of security.

Andrew J. Shapiro states that today more countries believe it is in their national interest to form a security relationship with the U.S. than in years past.²⁷ Their desire emerges from a perception that they are unable to mitigate external and internal threats without the support and guidance of the United States. Shapiro explains the transition of threat from the fear of the power of neighboring countries to those same countries potential weakness.²⁸ The Arab Spring exacerbates this fear with the uncertainty brought

²⁵ Theodoulou, Michael, Sinaiee, Maryam, “Iran ‘Can do Little After GCC Sends Troops to Bahrain Say Analysts,” *The National*, (Mar 2011) <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/iran-can-do-little-after-gcc-sends-troops-to-bahrain-say-analysts> (accessed 16 Dec 2012).

²⁶ Cruickshank, Paul, “Analysis: Why Arab Spring Could Be Al Qaeda’s Fall,” *CNN World* (Feb 2011) http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-21/world/arab.unrest.alqaeda.analysis_1_zawahiri-al-qaeda-qaeda-style?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 8 Dec 2012).

²⁷ Shapiro, Andrew, “A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance,” *The Washington Quarterly* (Fall 2012), p 24, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.725021> (accessed 18 Oct 2012).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p 25

about by the transitioning governments. Essentially, a weak government with a weak military is potentially helpless to stop a terrorist organization from using its territory as a safe haven.

McKenzie and Packard also touch on the importance of a real or perceived common threat. They do this by giving the example of joint exercises and training missions, describing how they are strictly focused on areas of “mutual concern.”²⁹ They continue by stating that common cause is the “hallmark of mil-to-mil engagements” and this is what creates long lasting relationships between militaries, and in, extent nations.³⁰

Additional Factors: There is another aspect of the countries in question that have enabled them to retain the status quo despite the uprisings. Most of it has to do with how they used the security cooperation they received from the United States. Eva Bellin published two articles in the journal, *Comparative Politics* that explain the intricacies of the governments of the MENA region. She conducted two studies; the first one in 2004, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in the Comparative Perspective,” and then she revised it in 2012 after the Arab Spring in “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring.” In both studies she discusses the reasons why the region as a whole failed to initiate the transition from authoritarianism to democracy (as eventually occurred in some nations during the Arab Spring) while other regions of the world had.

The prerequisites that she identified for democracy were present; however, she argued that a robust “coercive apparatus” that is willing and able to stamp out opposition

²⁹ McKenzie, Kenneth, Packard, Elizabeth, “Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring,” *Prism* 3, No. 1, p 104.

³⁰ Ibid, p 104

enables the regime to remain in power and to be repressive.³¹ This coercive apparatus in most cases is the nation's military and security services. What is a willing and able coercive apparatus? Bellin tells us that there are four factors that explain the power of these agencies and organizations in the Middle East and North African region: financial health of the apparatus, international support, level of institutionalization, and the degree of popular mobilization against it.

These factors can apply directly to the countries analyzed in this chapter, specifically when looking at why certain regimes did not topple. In most cases, as Bellin discusses, financial health of the security services are covered by "rentier income."³² Most countries in the GCC receive rent for oil resources, basing rights (from the United States), and foreign aid. International support, in the form of security cooperation from the United States, has boosted the coercive apparatus of these countries in order to protect strategic interests (flow of oil, containing Islamic extremism, and Iran).

In further discussion of the "rentier" countries, such as the GCC countries, Daniel Byman explains that oil economies may inhibit democratization as the "top-down" rent from oil reserves strengthen the governments and they don't need to tax citizens for revenue.³³ Revenue without taxation gives the government the say on how they want to

³¹ Bellin, Eva, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No.2 (Jan.,2004) pp 139-157 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150140> (accessed 9 Nov 2012)

Bellin, Eva, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics*, (Jan., 2012) pp 127-149.

³² Bellin, Eva, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No.2 (Jan.,2004) p 148 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150140> (accessed 9 Nov 2012)

³³ Byman, Daniel, "Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects," *Political Science Quarterly* Vol.127 No 1 (2012) p 42.

spend the money received from rent. This enables the government to develop a robust security apparatus of their own design.

The GCC countries have a patrimonial security structure, meaning the head of the security forces is more than likely a relative or a tribal member of the head of the country. This makes them heavily vested in the continuity of the regime. In other words, they will be more inclined to use violence to stop an uprising and prevent regime collapse.

Bahrain for example has a Sunni led security apparatus, while the recent protesters have been largely Shia. This creates an “*us versus them*” mentality at the national level.

Bellin’s final factor, the degree of popular mobilization against the regime can also be applied to the Gulf countries and Jordan. The protests there, in comparison to Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, etc., were relatively small, with the exception of Bahrain.

Bellin’s argument is simply that security forces will have an easier time using violence to quell a smaller revolt than a larger one.

Case Study

The countries chosen for the case studies are the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Both, as the names suggest, are monarchies; additionally, Bahrain is a member of the GCC while Jordan enjoys its support. The two countries endured protests during Arab Spring; both have attempted reform, and as of April 2014, the governments are still in place. Bahrain and Jordan are still suffering from ongoing protests resulting from the uprising. Both are strategically important to the United States and enjoy considerable security assistance. The literature suggests the Arab Spring will not affect security cooperation in these countries as long as the regimes stay in power. Security cooperation with the United States will not likely change as long as the regimes

make the necessary public concessions to stay intact. The threat has not changed and may have even increased, causing the countries to move closer to the United States.

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Jordan is a monarchy with a constitution, but it is not quite a constitutional monarchy. The King is the head of the state, but there is also a parliament with a Prime Minister. In Jordan's case, King Abdallah II, who has ruled since 1999, has the power to approve and dismiss the Prime Minister and the parliament. Jordan's economy is for the most part reliant on foreign aid.³⁴

Security Relationship with the United States

Primarily due to its geographic location, maintaining Jordan as a capable ally is vital for the United States. Jordan is bordered by Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. It acts as a buffer between the other Arab countries and Israel, prevents spillover from Syrian conflict, and maintains a large Palestinian refugee population. USCENTCOM Commander General Mattis explained Jordan's importance in his Commander's Posture Statement:

Jordan remains one of our staunchest regional allies, ready to stand by us when we need them and one that has deployed side by side with U.S. forces. Jordan has shared interests with the U.S. – and other responsible Middle East nations – in regional stability and reform. We remain grateful for King Abdullah's leadership in hosting direct discussions between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) leadership is committed to its partnership with the U.S. and understands that in order to stay relevant, they must adapt their forces.³⁵

³⁴ Sharp, Jeremy M., "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) p 1 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

³⁵ Mattis, James N. General, "Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps Commander U.S. Central Command Before the House Armed Service Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command,"

Military assistance to Jordan is in the form of FMF and IMET. Jordan used FMF to upgrade and modernize its air force and counter-terror capability. The kingdom has purchased upgrades to its F-16 fighters, air-to-air missiles, radar systems, and Blackhawk helicopters.³⁶ In October 2012, the United States agreed to upgrade the Royal Jordanian Air Force's national air command, control, and communications infrastructure.³⁷ Jordan receives U.S. anti-terrorism assistance from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and related Programs and also has several PATRIOT Anti-Missile Batteries that it received in 2003 prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.³⁸

In partnership with the United States, Jordan hosts several combined exercises on its territory, two of which are "Early Victor" and "Eager Lion." "Early Victor" is conducted annually and most recently Jordan hosted "Eager Lion" which was conducted in June 2013, with over 19 countries participating.³⁹ The goal of the exercise was to increase military engagement and interoperability. The United States also helped to finance the construction of the King Abdallah II Special Operations Training Center, an international training facility in Amman.⁴⁰ Interoperability and modernization that was advanced by security cooperation enabled the Jordanian Air Force to participate in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya.

Mar 2012, p 17, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Mattis%2003-06-12.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

³⁶ Sharp, Jeremy M., "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 11-16 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

³⁷ Baleseshan, "Lockheed Martin (LMT) Receives Foreign Military Sales Contract From U.S. Air Force," *iStock Analyst*, (Oct 2012) <http://www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/6112388/lockheed-martin-lmt-receives-foreign-military-sales-contract-from-u-s-air-force> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

³⁸ Sharp, Jeremy M., "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 11-16 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

³⁹ Hazaimah, Hani, "Eager Lion Kicks Off with 8,000 Army Personnel Participants," *The Jordan Times*, (June 2013) <http://jordantimes.com/eager-lion-kicks-off-with-8000-army-personnel-participants> (accessed 30 March 2014).

⁴⁰ Sharp, Jeremy M., "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) p 15 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

Jordan's Arab Spring Experience

Like other countries in the region, the Arab Spring uprisings in Jordan began in January 2011. The protests were largely nonviolent and called for economic and political reform. Similar to protests in the GCC countries, the protests called for reform and the removal of “corrupt” ministers, but not the ouster of the King, at least not initially.⁴¹

After making token reforms the protests subsided; however, protests reignited in October 2012 after a decision to cut fuel subsidies. In some of the new protests the people called for the ouster of the regime.⁴²

Public Opinion: King Abdallah acted quickly to quell the protests in early 2011: he increased salaries of state employees, dismissed the current prime minister, and appointed a committee to study reform. These initial reforms were not enough and the people continued to protest. King Abdallah made a televised speech and promised additional reforms: announced a parliamentary form of government where the prime minister would be elected by the people, limited the king's power to dismiss parliament, announced amendments to the constitution, and again dismissed the prime minister.⁴³

Additionally, the government was able to play divisions in society off of each other; to slow the unrest. Jordan is split into two groups, West Bank Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians which are composed of Palestinians and original Jordanian tribes respectively.⁴⁴ The monarchy's support base has traditionally been with the East Bank

⁴¹ Moon, Younghoon, “Democracy on the Horizon: How the Arab Spring is Unfolding in Jordan,” *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2012, pp 28-31.

⁴² Hamed, Muhammad, “Jordan Engulfed in Protests Over Fuel Price Hike,” *RT*, (Nov 2012) <http://rt.com/news/jordan-protests-fuel-hike-452/> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁴³ Tobin, Sarah A., “Jordan's Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” *Middle East Policy* vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 2012 pp 105-106.

⁴⁴ Sharp, Jeremy M., “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 1-2 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

Jordanians. This group enjoys representation in parliament, government jobs, and military positions. The Palestinians have limited representation, and make up at least half of the population.

The recent November 2012 protests over cuts in fuel subsidies saw the first time the public called for the abdication of the King.⁴⁵ Additionally, the East Bank Bedouin tribes that make up the security apparatus that protects the monarchy have also begun to protest, a worrisome sign for the regime. Labeling the protests as Palestinian unrest, creates a sense of illegitimacy, and keeps the public from realizing the kingdom's base is cracking.⁴⁶

Many protesters were arrested and are facing lengthy imprisonment for calling for the downfall of King Abdallah. Freedom House has rated Jordan as "Not Free," citing the government's closure of internet sites and other forms of media that were critical of the regime.⁴⁷ The United States has so far given support to the King and applauded his continuous efforts for reform. As long as the King remains in power, continued security cooperation with the United States will not be in danger.

Common Threat: Terrorism continues to be a threat shared between the United States and Jordan; thus, maintaining Jordan's capabilities is in the best interest of both countries. The stability of Jordan is vital to the stability of the region, particularly with the current unrest in Syria and the threat of spillover violence. For example, in October 2012, Jordan security forces foiled a terrorist plot targeting the U.S. Embassy among

⁴⁵ RT, "US not Impressed with Arab Spring Reaching Jordan?" (Nov 2012) <http://rt.com/news/jordan-protest-king-leave-899/> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁴⁶ Moon, Younghoon, "Democracy on the Horizon: How the Arab Spring is Unfolding in Jordan," *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2012, p 31.

⁴⁷ Freedom House, "Clampdown on Government Critics Augurs Poorly for Jordan," (Aug 2012) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/clampdown-government-critics-augurs-poorly-jordan> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

other locations in Jordan. The terrorists had reportedly crossed the border from Syria and were planning on using weapons they had acquired there.⁴⁸

Jordan has demonstrated their willingness to continue cooperating with the United States during and post Arab Spring. Cooperation can be seen in the multi-national Eager Lion exercise and their recent contributions to Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya. Terrorism remains a threat to Jordan due to their steadfast pro-Western policy in the region.

However, Jordan may be vulnerable to the actions and opinions of its neighbors, especially since it is reliant on foreign aid in order to function. There were rumors that Qatar had offered Jordan economic aid in exchange for allowing HAMAS to establish a base of operations on their territory after being expelled from Syria.⁴⁹ HAMAS was originally told to leave Jordan in 1999 on the request of the United States. Jordan has said that it will not allow HAMAS to use Jordan as a launching pad for operations, but will allow the leadership and their families to live in the country.⁵⁰ Allowing HAMAS back into Jordan is perceived as a slap in the face to the United States, but it is unlikely to change security assistance, unless Jordanian leadership were to turn a blind eye to nefarious activities conducted by HAMAS.

⁴⁸ Schanzer, Jonathan, "Why Failed Terror Attack in Jordan Matters to U.S.," *CNN World* (Oct 2012) <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/29/why-failed-terror-attack-in-jordan-matters-to-u-s/> (accessed 16 Dec 2012).

⁴⁹ HAMAS is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm>

⁵⁰ Vick, Karl, "Jordan Allows Hamas to Take Up Residence on Its Soil," *Time: World* (Jan 2012) <http://world.time.com/2012/01/09/jordan-allows-hamas-to-take-up-residence-on-its-soil/> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

Naylor, Hugh, Ma'ayeh, Suha Phillip "Jordan Apology to Hamas Baffles Many," *The National* (Dec 2011) <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/jordan-apology-to-hamas-baffles-many> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

The move to mend relations with HAMAS is the King's attempt to bolster his reputation in the Arab world. Jordan is not a member of the GCC, so it does not have to support afforded to the other monarchies. The King needs to appease its neighbors. Allowing HAMAS back into the country may placate the rebelling Palestinians inside of Jordan and the bordering West Bank. There is also a fear that the United States could abandon it, like it did to Mubarak of Egypt.

Kingdom of Bahrain

The Kingdom of Bahrain, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, is an island off of the Arabian Peninsula connected to Saudi Arabia by the King Fahd Causeway. It has been ruled by the al-Khalifa family since 1971. The King, Shaykh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has ruled since 1999. His uncle is the unelected Prime Minister, who has held power for over forty years.⁵¹

The Kingdom is ruled by a Sunni minority, keeping the Shia majority repressed. The military and government services are dominated by Sunni. Bahrain has gone so far to offer positions in the military and government to foreign Sunnis in order to keep the jobs from going to its Shias.⁵²

Security Relationship with the United States

The deep U.S. – Bahrain security relationship is the cornerstone for our collective security in the Gulf region. Home to our sole main operating base in the Mid-East, Bahrain provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting

⁵¹ Katzman, Kenneth, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 1-2 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁵² Ibid., p 7

U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet and providing facilities for other U.S. forces engaged in regional security. (GEN Mattis)⁵³

In 2002, President George W. Bush designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” which allows Bahrain to purchase the same weapons and enter into some of the cooperation afforded to NATO members.⁵⁴ The pinnacle of the U.S.-Bahrain relationship is Naval Support Activity-Bahrain (NSA-B). NSA-B is the home of Fifth Fleet and the naval component of USCENTCOM (NAVCENT). Approximately 5,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in Bahrain and at any given time it houses the command and control of 30,000 personnel and thirty ships operating in the region.⁵⁵ The base alone is a reason for U.S. to encourage security cooperation with Bahrain.

The United States also has a bilateral defense pact with Bahrain. The pact provides access to NSA-B, air bases, and pre-positioned strategic munitions; in return, Bahrain receives consultations if its security is threatened, training exercises, and increased training for its forces. The pact was first signed in 1991 and has been renewed until 2016.⁵⁶

Bahrain is a recipient of Foreign Military Funds, International Military Education and Training, and Excess Defense Article transfers. FMF is used to modernize Bahrain's fleet of F-16s, maintain U.S. origin weapons, air defense,

⁵³ Mattis, James N. General, “Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps Commander U.S. Central Command Before the House Armed Service Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command,” Mar 2012, p 19, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Mattis%2003-06-12.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁵⁴ Katzman, Kenneth, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,” *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 21-22 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp 22-23.

⁵⁶ *AFP*, “US-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed,” (Aug 2011) http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i2bp6IG_k4Yle2IKlPux76Qz1BAA?docId=CNG_b36a715ab130ce2bbcf6408109ec0b93.241 (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

and counter-terrorism operations.⁵⁷ During the unrest in Bahrain, the United States placed a hold on any equipment that could potentially be used against protesters, as the United States-provided equipment is for defense against external threats and to aid in U.S. operations. The hold came about after it became known that Bahrain had a shipment of Humvees and TOW anti-tank weapons scheduled for delivery.⁵⁸

In May 2012, the United States announced that it would allow Bahrain to purchase equipment for its defense forces, Coast Guard, and National Guard. This equipment included: harbor security boats, upgraded engines for F-16 aircraft, and additional air-to-air missiles.⁵⁹

Bahrain's Arab Spring Experience

The protests in Bahrain began in February 2011 and were conducted largely by the Shia population. Their demands were to alter the constitution to allow greater authority to the Council of Representatives (COR), to allow the Shias to gain a majority in the COR, to provide job opportunities, and to replace the current prime minister. The government was quick to use force to stop the demonstrations, but after a month of continued protests it attempted to meet some demands.⁶⁰

After mediation efforts failed and violence continued, the GCC's Peninsula Shield Force was deployed to Bahrain to end the protests. The Saudi led Peninsula Shield Force

⁵⁷ Katzman, Kenneth, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 24 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁵⁸ Ibid p 26

⁵⁹ Labott, Elise, "U.S. Resumes Arms Sales to Bahrain," *CNN: Security Clearance* (May 2012) <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/11/u-s-resumes-arms-sales-to-bahrain/> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁶⁰ Mitchell, Michael, "The Aborted Revolution: The Demise of Bahrain's Democracy Movement," *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2012, pp 32-36.

stayed for four months and saw an end to the demonstrations, allowing the Bahraini government to gain the upper hand.⁶¹

Public Opinion: Bahrain witnessed some of the most violent protests of the GCC countries. King Hamad has attempted reform since he took the throne from his father; however, the al-Khalifa royal family remains in control of the government and will not compromise on the suggestion of change. The country is divided socially between the Sunnis and Shias, and the protests were a mirror image of that chasm.⁶² The Shia protested and the Sunni security forces cracked down. It was in the Sunnis' best interest to keep the Shia repressed as their demands could fundamentally change the Sunni's accustomed way of living.

The Bahraini GDP does not originate from rent as does other oil wealthy countries in the GCC, but its strategic location means that it will always receive funding from Saudi Arabia and the United States. This keeps the monarchy in power and encourages it to maintain the status quo. The government conducted the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the uprisings and provide suggestions for reform. The recommendations for reform and constitutional changes were made, but rejected by the opposition as not going far enough.⁶³

Freedom House rates Bahrain as "Not Free." The government has banned all public rallies and demonstrations, revoked the citizenship of some activists, and arrested thousands of protesters.⁶⁴ As mentioned above, the United States has succumbed to some

⁶¹ Mitchell, Michael, "The Aborted Revolution: The Demise of Bahrain's Democracy Movement," *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2012, pp 33-35.

⁶² Ibid., p 35.

⁶³ Katzman, Kenneth, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 10-12 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁶⁴ Freedom House, "Bahrain Revokes Citizenship for 31 Activists," (Nov 2012) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/bahrain-revokes-citizenship-31-activists> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

international pressure to halt support to the regime, but it still may have tarnished its image internationally.

Common Threat: Iran poses the largest threat to Bahrain and is a threat shared with the United States. The Kingdom fears that Iran has the ability to influence its Shia majority going so far as to call the uprising a “foreign plot” against the country.⁶⁵ Their fears may not be too far-fetched, as the former Iranian parliament speaker labeled Bahrain Iran’s “fourteenth province.”⁶⁶ This fear of Iranian interference will ensure Bahrain remains amenable to U.S. security interests in the region despite regional uprisings. This fear will also keep them a recipient of Saudi Arabian support.

Saudi Arabia fears that the protests in Bahrain will spread to their Shia population on the east coast and impact their oil production.⁶⁷ They also fear that if the monarchy were to fall in Bahrain, there is a good possibility that the idea will spread that monarchies could fall elsewhere. Therefore, Saudi Arabia will do their best to prevent unrest across the GCC monarchies. It is Saudi Arabia’s best interest to keep the monarchies stable, and that would maintain Bahrain’s relationship with the United States.

Conclusion

As described in the case studies, Bahrain and Jordan endured their own versions of the Arab Spring that revolved around the populace desiring more opportunities and greater representation in government. The similarities of the uprisings in the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco, are that the population did not call for the fall of the

⁶⁵ Katzman, Kenneth, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,” *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 28-29 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁶⁶ *The Telegraph*, “Bahrain as ‘Iran’s Fourteenth Province,’” (Feb 2011) <http://www.iranian.com/main/news/2011/02/17/bahrain-irans-fourteenth-province> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

⁶⁷ Katzman, Kenneth, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,” *Congressional Research Service*, (Oct 2012) pp 31 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed 25 Nov 2012).

regime until promised reforms were either not enacted or were seen as merely lip-service. With the regimes in place, security cooperation isn't likely to change.

Additionally, during the Arab Spring, public opinion in the monarchies never called for a change of relationship with the United States. Public protests focused on equal rights, representation in the government, and fair wages. The monarchies made limited concessions to appease the demands of the public. If the population started to protest its nation's relationship with the United States with the same fervor as the initial stages of the Arab Spring, and place blame on the United States for its current situation, then the government would likely reassess the position they have with American involvement in the region. However, as it stands the Arab Spring has not changed public opinion in regards to security cooperation in the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco.

The threat of internal and external actors remains a constant factor in changing a security relationship. In regards to the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco, the dual threat of Islamic extremism and Iranian influence remains the same before and after Arab Spring. The double threat encourages the countries to seek security cooperation with the United States as the guarantor of security. The "common threat" and U.S. interests in the region will enable the United States to continue encouraging such cooperation.

The changing political atmospheres of neighboring countries have created a sense of uncertainty. The United States has supported the regimes for so long, that cooperation will be seen as a source of stability. As long as the United States applauds reform efforts, the monarchies will be encouraged to continue cooperation. In contrast, there is also suspicion of U.S. policy in the region. The monarchies have witnessed the United States "betrayal" of long-time allies in the region (Egypt's Mubarak) and they may question the

resiliency of its alliances. This suggests the possibility of pushing the GCC countries together into stronger military alliances to support themselves or to seek a new or additional partner elsewhere.

Although, the relationships with the United States has arguably remained the same following the advent of Arab Spring, there is still a potential that they could change if protests continue. Public opinion did cause the monarchies to make token reforms and in some cases those reforms were successful in diverting or delaying the uprisings. It may be too early to say whether the Arab Spring will ultimately bring the monarchies into a type of democracy or cause them to fall.

CHAPTER 2: The Failure of ‘Responsibility to Protect:’ A Comparison of the Conflicts in Libya and Syria

After the Arab Spring and the subsequent unrest across the Middle East and North Africa, it has become increasingly apparent that several governments have failed to protect their citizens from atrocities, and in most cases the governments themselves have been the perpetrators. On their own initiative the populations of several countries forced regime change; including those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. Libya and Syria became embroiled in armed internal conflicts, with the conflict in Syria currently ongoing. The situations in both Libya and Syria are similar in the way the unrest unfolded and how their respective governments reacted, but each case has been treated differently by the international community.

In March 2011, only one month after the unrest began in Libya, the United Nations (UN) authorized armed humanitarian intervention (“Responsibility to Protect”) to stop Muammar Qadhafi from killing anymore of his people. However, in Syria, the conflict has been continuing without pause since March 2011. It has evolved into a civil war, where the UN has reported the death toll to be over 100,000 and rising daily.⁶⁸ Additionally, well over two million civilians have fled the country as refugees.⁶⁹ Under the UN’s concept of “Responsibility to Protect,” the international community has a responsibility to defend the citizens of countries that have failed to protect their own. In fact, the principles of “Responsibility to Protect” were used as justification for the

⁶⁸ Gander, Kashmira, “UN to Stop Updating Death Toll in Syria Conflict,” The Independent, January 7, 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/un-to-stop-updating-death-toll-in-syria-conflict-9045096.html> (accessed 22 March 2014).

⁶⁹ UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> (accessed 22 March 2014).

intervention in Libya.⁷⁰ This raises the question, that if “Responsibility to Protect” was used to justify the intervention in Libya, why does the concept not compel intervention in Syria?

In order to answer this question, it is important to first understand the nature of “Responsibility to Protect,” and then examine its relevance in the context of the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. Following this examination, I will identify the differences between the situations in Libya and Syria and determine whether Syria meets the proposed R2P criteria for armed intervention as Libya did, and identify how “Responsibility to Protect” is implemented under the auspices of the UN. First, it is necessary to examine humanitarian intervention and the policy of “Responsibility to Protect,” which is an emerging international norm, but not a legally binding framework for intervention.

Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention is a vague term; from a body of scholarship on the topic, it is best described as “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing the widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”⁷¹ Humanitarian intervention isn’t just military direct action, as it is popularly depicted; it instead is a blanket concept that covers a range of options available to the international community. Prior to armed conflict, the international community normally engages in other coercive action, such as diplomatic efforts and sanctions to influence the offending government.

⁷⁰ NPR, “Obama’s Speech on Libya: ‘A Responsibility to Act’,” (March 28, 2011) <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134935452/obamas-speech-on-libya-a-responsibility-to-act> (accessed 4 May 2014).

⁷¹ Palmer, Alex, “Evil by Any Other Name: Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century,” *Harvard International Review* (Fall 2010) p32.

The international community's failure to effectively respond to the events in Rwanda and the unilateral actions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo, drive the debate for and against humanitarian intervention operations. It wasn't until after the NATO intervention in Kosovo that the international community gave the concept of humanitarian intervention more attention.⁷² In 2005, the UN officially began referring to humanitarian intervention as the "Responsibility to Protect."⁷³ For the purpose of this chapter I will use both terms interchangeably.

The literature surrounding "Responsibility to Protect" focuses on arguments for and against intervention. Consistently, the basis of these arguments is the selective nature of intervention: why intrude in the affairs of one state and not the other? Humanitarian intervention is seen by some theorists as an excuse by a stronger state to breach the sovereignty of another to further its own interests, which results in policy or regime change. In other words, to some, humanitarian intervention occurs as a country or group of countries violates the sovereignty of another State to essentially meddle in its domestic affairs.

Humanitarian intervention is always a controversial subject; the international community is either doing too much or not enough; it often is driven by moral or legal reasons which are viewed differently by those on opposing sides.⁷⁴ Before delving into the arguments and controversies surrounding "Responsibility to Protect," and how those arguments are applied to the conflicts in Libya and Syria, it is first important to examine

⁷² International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "Responsibility to Protect," (December 2001) p VII.

⁷³ United Nations General Assembly, "2005 World Summit Outcome," *A/RES/60/1 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly*, (24 October 2005) p30.

⁷⁴ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "Responsibility to Protect," (December 2001) p2.

the efforts the international community has taken to institutionalize and legalize humanitarian intervention.

ICISS and Responsibility to Protect

In 2001, an ad hoc body, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), was established to aid the international community and the United Nations in finding a common ground on the issue of humanitarian intervention and to address the challenges associated with its selective application. ICISS was composed of Canadian government officials and members of the UN General Assembly. Their primary goal was to answer the question of when it is “appropriate for states to take coercive action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state.”⁷⁵ One of the Commission’s main challenges was the issue of sovereignty, because by its nature, humanitarian *intervention* is a violation of another state’s sovereignty. To work around this problem, they changed the terminology of humanitarian intervention to “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P. Sovereignty was also characterized as causing a state to have inherent responsibilities, and one of those responsibilities was to protect its own people.⁷⁶

The overarching theme of R2P, as envisioned by the ICISS, is that first a sovereign government is responsible for the protection of its own people. If a government is unable to provide that protection or if the government is causing harm to its people, then it is the responsibility of the international community to protect the people, and national sovereignty becomes second to the international community’s responsibility to

⁷⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “Responsibility to Protect,” (December 2001) p9.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p13

protect.⁷⁷ The Commission established three principles of R2P: the international community has the responsibility *to prevent* (address the cause of unrest before it becomes a humanitarian crisis), the responsibility *to react* (respond with appropriate means to end a humanitarian crisis), and the responsibility *to rebuild* (recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation). ICISS also established six criteria that must be met before military intervention is appropriate. The criteria proposed by ICISS are:

Just Cause: ICISS gave two events that would offer a just cause to military intervention.

One is a large scale loss of life which is caused by the state or caused because the state could not prevent it.⁷⁸ The other is large scale ethnic cleansing. A just cause under the ICISS report is *not* intervention to restore democracy or intervention to protect its own citizens in the offending country.⁷⁹ Just cause does not allow regime removal unless it can be proven without a doubt that the regime is the cause of the loss of life.⁸⁰

Right Intention: The motive of the intervening state or states should be to stop human suffering despite other interests the state may have or other reasons the state may have for intervening.⁸¹

Last Resort: Military force should only be used after every other non-violent option has been used. Non-violent options include among others, economic sanctions, embargos, and diplomatic efforts.⁸²

⁷⁷ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "Responsibility to Protect," (December 2001) pXI.

⁷⁸ Ibid. pXII.

⁷⁹ Acharya, Amitav, "Redefining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.56, No.3, (2002) p374-375.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "Responsibility to Protect," (December 2001) pXII.

⁸² Ibid.

Legitimate Authority: Under ICISS, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the best authority to grant military intervention on humanitarian grounds.⁸³

Proportional Means: The duration and intensity of the force used in intervention should only be enough to secure the humanitarian objective.⁸⁴

Reasonable Prospect: There must be a chance for success in stopping the humanitarian crisis, without causing more harm than good.⁸⁵

The criteria for military intervention used by ICISS are similar to the criteria established in the Just War Theory for *jus ad bellum* (justice of resort to war) and *jus in bello* (justice in the conduct of war). Just War Theory sets moral constraints and conditions for war; thus, logically, the responsibility to protect is derived from Just War Theory, in a humanitarian scenario.⁸⁶

The ICISS developed the criteria to constrain countries from using R2P as an excuse for invasion and furthering their own national interests. It was also intended to make intervention selectivity more transparent.⁸⁷ In theory, if all the criteria were met, intervention would be a “Just War” as defined by Just War Theory. Arguably, this would make it difficult for a member of the UNSC to use a veto, because doing so would essentially be a failure to meet the “Responsibility to Protect.”

However, while certain recommendations of the ICISS report were adopted by the UN, the criteria listed above were not. The United States, China, and Russia opposed the

⁸³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “Responsibility to Protect,” (December 2001) pXII.

⁸⁴ Ibid. pXIII

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Fixdal, Mona, Smith, Dan, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol 42, No. 2 (Nov 1998). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/254418> (accessed 25 Feb 2013) p286-287.

⁸⁷ Bellamy, Alex J., “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention,” *International Affairs* 84:4 (2008) p625.

idea for having to meet a set criterion before committing to armed intervention. The United States felt that criteria would constrain its ability to act; while China and Russia believed the criteria would be used to circumvent the UNSC.⁸⁸ Regardless, the criteria are an appropriate tool to analyze the international community's rationale and selectiveness for armed humanitarian intervention.

Actions of the United Nations General Assembly

The UN took the ICISS report into consideration and adopted certain elements to create the policy of "Responsibility to Protect." The affirmation of R2P was announced in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit which identified four events that would automatically trigger "Responsibility to Protect:" genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.⁸⁹

The UN developed three pillars to implement responsibility to protect. These pillars generally mirror the principles of the ICISS report and are:

Pillar One: The Protection Responsibilities of the State. The state is responsible for the protection of its people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Bellamy, Alex J., "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention," *International Affairs* 84:4 (2008) p626

⁸⁹ United Nations General Assembly, "2005 World Summit Outcome," *A/RES/60/1 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly*, (24 October 2005) p30.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) defines war crimes as acts committed as part of a plan or policy. The Court defines crimes against humanity as "acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."

International Criminal Court, "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," (2011) p 3-5

<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2013).

⁹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect," *A/63/677*, (12 January 2009) p8.

Pillar Two: International Assistance and Capacity Building. The international community has a responsibility to help the state with its responsibility to protect.⁹¹

Pillar Three: Timely and Decisive Response. This is the responsibility of the international community to “respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.”⁹² There are many options for the international community to use as a response; military action is to be the last.

The Counter-Argument

In one of his many arguments against humanitarian intervention, political activist Noam Chomsky writes that there has never been a pure humanitarian intervention; rather states are motivated by their own interests.⁹³ This is the crux of the disagreement. The implementation of humanitarian intervention is selective and conducted primarily when states have an interest. In other words, a state is motivated by its interests and the plight of humanity alone is rarely strong enough to motivate a state to intervene abroad.⁹⁴

The United States, and by extension NATO, has used humanitarian intervention as one of the reasons for its conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kosovo, and most recently in Libya. It has also *not* been implemented in other places and events where it would seem logical to use humanitarian intervention because of the similarities. Examples include: Rwanda, where mass genocide occurred, and now Syria, which is quickly becoming a humanitarian disaster. As mentioned previously, humanitarian

⁹¹ United Nations General Assembly, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” A/63/677, (12 January 2009) p9.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Palmer, Alex, “Evil by Any Other Name: Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century,” *Harvard International Review* (Fall 2010) p32.

⁹⁴ Eckert, Amy E., “The Responsibility to Protect in the Anarchical Society: Power, Interest, and the Protection of Civilians in Libya and Syria,” *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy* Vol 41:1 (2012) p91.

intervention is seen by some governments, as the strong forcing their will on the weak; or as Noam Chomsky cites Thucydides, “the strong do as they wish, while the weak suffer as they must.”⁹⁵

Establishing the right intention (the first ICISS criteria) prior to intervention may be an answer to the selectiveness of humanitarian intervention. If the intervening country has the right intention, it will intercede in the situation, solve the problem at hand and then leave. Brian Orend argues for adding additional criteria to the Just War Theory that would require a state to commit itself to rules of conduct during war and have a predetermined termination.⁹⁶ In Orend’s theory, a state would fight only for the sake of a just cause and for no other reason.⁹⁷ The predetermined termination of military action would, in theory, prevent the intervening party from pursuing its own interests and would oblige it to concentrate on the task at hand. The nation doing the intervening would also have to declare its intentions for humanitarian intervention publicly; questions would be asked if the country were to stray from the pre-intercession announced objective.

Similarly, Michael Walzer argues that a true humanitarian intervention occurs when the military forces are “quickly in and out.”⁹⁸ In essence, military forces intercede and assist the people with the immediate problem causing the crisis and then leave the people to their own devices. Walzer admits that in most interventions this is easier said than done.

⁹⁵ Chomsky, Noam, “UN Address: Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect,” *ZNET*, (5 August 2009) <http://www.zcommunications.org/un-address-dialogue-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-by-noam-chomsky> (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

⁹⁶ Koeman, Annalisa, “A Realistic and Effective Constraint on the Resort to Force? Pre-commitment to *Jus in Bello* and *Jus Post Bellum* as Part of the Criterion of Right Intention,” *Journal of Military Ethics* Vol.6, No.3 (2007) p199-200.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Walzer, Michael, “The Politics of Rescue,” *Social Research* Vol. 62, No.1 (Spring 1995) p56.

ICISS described multilateral intervention as the best way to maintain the appropriate intention. Multilateral is defined as multiple countries acting together, generally after a consensus has been achieved from an international governing body. In this scenario a “coalition of the willing” is formed to intervene on a people’s behalf and do so on the authority of the United Nations. The 2012 international operation in Libya offers a good example of multilateral intervention.

Conversely, there is also an argument for unilateral humanitarian intervention without the consent of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although, not always followed, a State is supposed to seek the approval of the UNSC before resorting to the use of force and military intervention on humanitarian grounds is not exempt. For example, in 1999, NATO implemented a unilateral humanitarian intervention in Kosovo to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by the Serbians. NATO bypassed the UNSC to avoid the inevitable veto of the operation by Russia and/or China. There was objection to NATO’s actions, but ultimately it became the catalyst for creating “Responsibility to Protect.” The UN deemed NATO’s actions in Kosovo as illegal and a threat to international order, but that it “should be morally approved because the law cannot be allowed to block humanitarian intervention in exceptional cases of humanitarian emergency.”⁹⁹

As alluded to previously, if one of the Permanent Five of the UNSC does not want intervention to happen, it won’t. Russia and China, both Permanent Five members, generally oppose R2P. When asked about NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, Russian president, Vladimir Putin said “We never would have agreed to that type of interference in

⁹⁹ Wheeler, Nicholas J., “Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and International Law,” *NACAO eDEFESA* No105-2 (2003) p203.

the internal affairs of another country. That type of behavior simply cannot be justified, even for so-called humanitarian reasons.”¹⁰⁰ Russia, did however, use humanitarian intervention as their explanation for their invasion of the Republic of Georgia in 2008.¹⁰¹ China opposes R2P on the grounds that it is a breach of sovereignty. China feels that human rights abuses and massacres are a domestic or regional issue. The Chinese special envoy for Darfur was quoted as saying, “it is not China’s Darfur, it is first Sudan’s Darfur and then Africa’s Darfur.”¹⁰²

When establishing the “Responsibility to Protect,” ICISS attempted to resolve many of these issues. They gave a warning to the Permanent Five of the UNSC in regards to this legitimate authority criterion. The Commission said “they should agree not to apply their veto power...to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes for which there is majority support.”¹⁰³ In other words, according to the ICISS, the UNSC would be failing its responsibility to protect if it were to veto a humanitarian intervention.

The Argument in Regards to Libya

There are telling differences between the situations in Libya and Syria that impact the international responsibility to protect in regards to both conflicts. Libya was the first intervention after the United Nation’s affirmation of “Responsibility to Protect,” essentially making it a test case. As anticipated, the intervention had its supporters and detractors. The legality of the Libyan intervention is questioned by some scholars and

¹⁰⁰ Bass, Gary J., “Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century,” *The Tocqueville Review*, Vol. XXX No 1 (2009) p21.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p22.

¹⁰² Ibid. p24.

¹⁰³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “Responsibility to Protect,” (December 2001) pXIII.

most importantly by Russia and China. This is primarily due to the fact that the mission ultimately ended in regime change when that wasn't the original goal. Yevgeny Voronin, a Russian scholar, argues that the use of force was approved too quickly, and sanctions and diplomatic efforts were not given enough time to work.¹⁰⁴ In this argument the ICISS criterion of last resort may not have been fully met, according to Voronin. Additionally, NATO was given authority to use force; however, it was also given the leeway to interpret what the use of force meant, which allowed the mission to evolve as deemed necessary by NATO.¹⁰⁵

Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and leading member of ICISS, described the intervention in Libya as "Responsibility to Protect" coming of age. According to him, it was a text book phased response that ultimately led to a successful military intervention by the international community.¹⁰⁶ In this view, the Libyan conflict justified "Responsibility to Protect." It was authorized by the UNSC quickly, and it was conducted by NATO and allies from the Middle East in a coalition of the willing.¹⁰⁷ However, humanitarian intervention morphed into regime change in what is seen by many as "mission creep." Mission creep is the expansion of a mission beyond its original goals, and it is a concern when contemplating humanitarian intervention. It creates the need to declare the intention of intervention beforehand. Libya's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR is a good example of mission creep; it was originally intended to be a no-

¹⁰⁴ Voronin, Yevgeny, "The Problem of the Legitimacy of Armed Intervention: Casus Belli Libya," *International Affairs* Vol. 58 No. 5 (2012) p198-199.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Evans, Gareth, "The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age," Project Syndicate (26 Oct 2011) <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-responsibility-to-protect-comes-of-age> (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

¹⁰⁷ Zifcak, Spencer, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria," *Melbourne Journal of International Law* Vol. 13 (2012) p61.

fly-zone to prevent the regime from attacking opposition forces, but as the conflict evolved, NATO forces were used to provide air support to allow the opposition to eliminate Qadhafi.

Case Study

In order to determine how the concept of R2P justified intervention in Libya and not in Syria, I must compare the two conflicts. Libya will be used as the accepted model for “Responsibility to Protect” to compare and contrast what is taking place in Syria since the beginning of the unrest. I will examine the UN’s Three Pillars associated with “Responsibility to Protect,” and how they have been implemented in both countries.

Then, to analyze whether armed intervention is appropriate and necessary, I will compare the two conflicts using the ICISS criteria for armed humanitarian intervention. Although the six criteria for military intervention were never formally adopted by the international community, they are fundamental criteria for a Just War and can arguably be used as a “checklist” to determine the feasibility of an armed intervention. For the purpose of this chapter, I will use the ICISS criteria to determine if the elements for a moral armed humanitarian intervention are in place.

It can be hypothesized that the difference between Libya and Syria is that the members of the UNSC did not have any over-riding national interests in the Libyan regime; national interests in Syria will limit the *legitimate authority* criterion. Additionally, the Libyan regime lacked the external support that the Syrian regime enjoys; this will hinder a *reasonable prospect* for success.

Libya vs. Syria: Responsibility to Protect

The following sections will briefly apply the UN pillars to both conflicts, and then analyze the criteria for armed intervention in the final pillar of Responsibility to Protect.

Pillar One: As explained by the United Nations report A/63/677, the first pillar of the “Responsibility to Protect” falls on the nation to protect its own people from harm. Both Libya and Syria failed to meet that responsibility. In both cases, the leaders used military force against unarmed protesters.

In Libya, mass protests began on 17 February 2011 calling for Muammar Qadhafi to step down as the country’s leader. A week later Qadhafi authorized the military to “crush” the uprising, calling the protestors “cockroaches.”¹⁰⁸ There were reports of snipers firing into crowds of protestors and regime use of artillery, helicopter gunships, and jets to kill civilians.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, Qadhafi was rumored to have deployed foreign mercenaries who would kill at will. The crisis quickly escalated with the development of an armed rebellion made up of military defectors and civilians.

The possible use of foreign mercenaries or militia is significant. This allows the threatened government to have plausible deniability in the eyes of the international community, while its people “know” that it is violence sanctioned by the government. Foreign militias/mercenaries will also not be as constrained by guilt in conducting acts of violence against the populace. For example a Chadian mercenary employed by Qadhafi to kill Libyans may not hesitate, while a Libyan soldier ordered to kill fellow Libyans

¹⁰⁸ BBC, “Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit,” *NEWS Middle East* (22 Feb 2011) www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624 (accessed 9 April 2013).

¹⁰⁹ Meo, Nick, “Libya Protests: 140 ‘Massacred’ as Gaddafi Sends in Snipers to Crush Dissent,” *The Telegraph* (20 Feb 2011) www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8335934/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-crush-dissent.html (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

will likely think twice. This same idea can be applied to a specific ethnic or religious militia dispatched to kill a different group of people, while sharing the same nationality. This is seen in Syria with the government's use of the Shabiha, which consists of the pro-regime Alawite sect.

In Syria, anti-government protests began sporadically in March 2011. The government focused its suppression tactics in the areas most prone to be anti-regime. One of the most significant events was the capture of a 13 year old boy by regime forces. His mutilated body was discovered on the doorstep of his family's home.¹¹⁰ In reaction to his murder, peaceful protests erupted across the country; they were met with military force. Assad justified his reaction by claiming his country was under attack from terrorists who were supported by foreign conspirators.¹¹¹ Similar to Qadhafi, Assad used a pro-government militia known as Shabiha to conduct killings. Also in parallel to the Libyan conflict, military defectors and civilians formed an armed rebellion to fight the government.

Pillar Two: Pillar Two of "Responsibility to Protect" is the international community's responsibility to assist the nation with upholding its obligation to protect its own people. The United Nations did exercise Pillar Two in both Libya and Syria. However, Pillar Two does seem to give some leeway to those already committing crimes against humanity: "those contemplating the incitement or perpetration of crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect need to be made to understand both the costs of

¹¹⁰ Kouri, Jim, "Boy Tortured, Castrated, Murdered by Syrian Secret Police," *Examiner.com*, (29 May 2011) www.examiner.com/article/boy-tortured-castrated-murdered-by-syrian-secret-police (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

¹¹¹ United Nations General Assembly, "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic," *A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1*, (23 Nov 2011) p8.

pursuing that path and the potential benefits of seeking peaceful reconciliation and development instead.”¹¹² It goes without saying that “crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect” were already taking place, however the United Nations still needed to remind the regimes of their responsibility to protect their people from crimes against humanity.

On 22 February 2011, after Qadhafi authorized force to root out the protesters, the UN Secretary General Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Advisor on R2P released a press statement expressing their concern over the reports of violence in Libya. They warned the Libyan government that if the attacks were as bad as reported, they may be accountable under crimes against humanity. They finished the statement by reminding the government of their responsibility to protect.¹¹³ On 25 February 2011, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) passed a resolution on the situation in Libya. It called on the Libyan government to release detained persons, stop attacks on civilians, ensure their safety, and unblock access to communications. It also “reminded Libya of its obligations...to uphold the highest standards of human rights” and guarantee access for human rights organizations to Libya.¹¹⁴ It is also important to note, that the actions taken by the Libyan government against its own people were widely condemned, even by the Arab League, Organization

¹¹² United Nations General Assembly, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” *A/63/677*, (12 January 2009) p16.

¹¹³ United Nations Press Release, “UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Libya,” (22 Feb 2011) <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20on%20Libya,%2022%20February%202011.pdf> (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

¹¹⁴ United Nations Human Rights, “Human Rights Council Passes Resolution on Libya in Special Session,” (25 Feb 2011) <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10768> (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

of Islamic Cooperation, and the African Union. All called for talks between the opposition and the government, in the hopes of mediating a ceasefire.¹¹⁵

Pillar Two events took place in Syria, as they did in Libya, but in a protracted amount of time. This was largely due to the Russian and Chinese concern that armed intervention and regime change was the ultimate goal. As in the Libyan situation, The United Nations Special Advisors on the Responsibility to Protect and the Prevention of Genocide issued a series of press releases that condemned the Syrian Governments use of violence and possible human rights violations. The statements began in June 2011 and started with concern about loss of life from the result of government suppression and reminded the Syrian Government of their responsibility under R2P.¹¹⁶ The releases continued in this vein for several months.

In March 2012, after a full year of government led violence, the Special Advisors' frustration with UNSC inaction could be seen in the following statements, "Clearly, the Government has manifestly failed to protect the Syrian population. It has resorted to extreme violence, instead of allowing the Syrian people to freely express their opinions and make their voices heard about the fate of their country."¹¹⁷ The release ended calling on the government to stop the violence, and pleading with the international community

¹¹⁵ Zifcak, Spencer, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria," Melbourne Journal of International Law Vol. 13 (2012) p63.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Press Release, "UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria," (2 Jun 2011) <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG%20statement%20Syria%202%20June%202011%20FINAL%20ENGLISH.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2013).

¹¹⁷ United Nations Press Release, "Marking a Full Year of Violent Suppression of Anti-government protests in Syria, the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck Release the Following Statement," (15 March 2012) <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Statement%20on%20Syria%2015%20March%20FINAL%20EN.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2013).

“to take collective action, utilizing the full range of tools available under the United Nations Charter, to protect populations at risk.”¹¹⁸

Pillar Three: Pillar Three is the international community’s responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in the case that the nation in question has failed to do so. This is to be done first with diplomatic and humanitarian means, and then if nothing else works, the international community can and should resort to force.¹¹⁹ It was ICISS’s intent that prior to the international community’s commitment to military intervention, that it would first meet the previously identified criteria.

Just Cause: As identified above, when discussing Pillar One in regard to both Libya and Syria, both countries had failed in their responsibility to protect their populations from crimes against humanity. This in itself is arguably enough to determine a just cause for armed humanitarian intervention.

Right Intention: Right intention for military intervention is hard to prove, especially when led by the West. Generally, given a history of colonialism, the world is suspicious of the West’s actions in the developing world. It is seen as the strong imposing their will on the weak. A multi-lateral coalition “of the willing” is the most appropriate to represent the international community’s interests when resorting to force. In the case of Libya, the intention was to implement a “no fly zone” to allow the rebels’ freedom of

¹¹⁸ United Nations Press Release, “Marking a Full Year of Violent Suppression of Anti-government protests in Syria, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck Release the Following Statement,” (15 March 2012) <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Statement%20on%20Syria%2015%20March%20FINAL%20EN.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2013).

¹¹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” A/63/677, (12 January 2009) p16.

movement and to “level the playing field.” It essentially prevented Qadhafi’s forces from using jets and helicopters to kill civilians. It also allowed the rebels to establish a safe haven in Benghazi, where they could form a transitional government. The intent became questionable when the coalition began to provide air support for the rebels and support them in their endeavor to overthrow Qadhafi. To summarize, in Libya the right intention existed, but it was allowed to morph during the heat of the conflict. This is an underlying factor in the reasons why some in the international community, specifically Russia and China, are concerned about the true intention of intervention in Syria.

The right intention for military intervention in Syria should be obvious as it was with Libya, to prevent continuous killing of civilians. However, if led by the West, there are those who offer many objections to cause doubt of the true intention of intervention. For instance, Iran holds significant influence over the al-Asad Alawite regime and provides military support through proxy. Syria is arguably its only foothold in the Middle East. Western military intervention could possibly be seen as a war to deny Iranian influence in the region. Russia also challenges the West’s right intention in Syria. The Russian ambassador to the UN said, “It’s all about Iran.” The invasion of Iraq inadvertently strengthened Iran and now “requires the West to weaken Tehran by challenging its ally in Damascus.”¹²⁰

Russia also holds interests in Syria. Similar to Iran, Syria is one of Russia’s only allies in the Middle East. It maintains extensive security cooperation through arms sales and maintains a naval base on the West Coast. It is likely that a post-Asad Syria may not

¹²⁰ Lauira, Rio “Russia, China, Veto Syria Resolution at U.N.,” *The Wall Street Journal* (19 Jul 2012) <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444097904577536793560681930.html> (accessed 7 Apr 2013).

be as friendly, so maintaining the status quo in Syria and preventing Western influence is in Russia's best interests.

Last Resort: Military intervention should be the last action after every non-violent means has been exasperated. In Libya, the UN passed *Resolution 1970* on 26 February 2011 one week after the violence began. *Resolution 1970* referred the Libyan situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to determine whether human rights violations had been committed. It also ordered an arms embargo, issued a travel ban and froze the assets of individuals complicit in human rights abuses. Additionally, it called on Member States to assist the return of humanitarian organizations to Libya.¹²¹ Despite the sanctions, the Government of Libya did not stop the systematic killing of civilians. On 17 March 2011, *Resolution 1973* was passed.

Resolution 1973 demanded the establishment of a cease-fire, recognized the efforts of the UN Special Envoy to Libya and the African Union to establish a dialogue, and demanded that the Libyan Government comply with its "Responsibility to Protect." It also authorized the Member States to "take all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya..." without deploying foreign forces on Libyan territory.¹²² The Resolution would give authority to enforce a no-fly-zone over Libya and enforce the arms embargo ordered under *Resolution 1970*.

On 29 April 2011, in Syria, the UN Human Rights Council passed *Resolution S-16/I*. The Resolution condemned the Syrian Governments use of violence on civilians

¹²¹ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1970 (2011)," S/RES/1970 (2011) (26 Feb 2011) p2-5.

¹²² The Guardian, "UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya – Full Text," (17 March 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/17/un-security-council-resolution> (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

and called on them to use restraint.¹²³ Several countries to include Russia and China were against the adoption of the Resolution on the reason that the situation was a domestic issue.¹²⁴ While some countries wanted to impose sanctions while other countries thought that sanctions were too much interference in Syrian affairs.

Despite a lack of UNSC action, the Arab League suspended Syria's membership, and imposed economic and political sanctions. Arab League observers were also deployed to the country to determine the extent of the human rights violations. The observer's actions were largely dictated by the regime, and they did little to stall the violence. In March 2013, the Arab League weakened the legitimacy of the al-Asad regime by giving Syrian membership to the opposition.¹²⁵

Russia and China vetoed three draft UNSC resolutions that threatened sanctions against the al-Asad regime if they didn't stop the violence.¹²⁶ However, there are limited sanctions implemented by individual states and regional organizations. The United States has sanctions that have been place since before the revolution. The sanctions generally restrict aid and trade. The European Union (EU) imposed sanctions after the revolution. EU sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans on the Syrian regime, arms embargo, sanctions on Syrian central bank, and bans on the import of Syrian oil and export of

¹²³ United Nations General Assembly, "The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in the Context of Recent Events," A/HRC/RES/S-16/1 (4 May 2011) p2.

¹²⁴ Zifcak, Spencer, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria," *Melbourne Journal of International Law* Vol. 13 (2012) p74-75.

¹²⁵ Hallun, Munzer, "Arab League Moves Toward Full-Scale War in Syria," *Russia Beyond the Headlines* (5 April 2013) http://rbth.ru/international/2013/04/05/arab_league_moves_toward_full-scale_war_in_syria_24679.html (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

¹²⁶ Lauira, Rio "Russia, China, Veto Syria Resolution at U.N.," *The Wall Street Journal* (19 Jul 2012) <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444097904577536793560681930.html> (accessed 7 Apr 2013).

equipment for the petrol industry.¹²⁷ The Syrian regime still receives aid from countries like Russia, Iran, and Iraq.

Legitimate Authority: Approval by the UNSC would serve as legitimate authority for military intervention. Although several countries abstained from voting for *UNSCR 1973* authorizing intervention in Libya, no country exercised their veto. Additionally the Arab League requested that the UN implement the no-fly-zone, giving intervention regional legitimacy.¹²⁸ The ICC had also issued arrest warrants for Muammar Qadhafi, his son Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, and Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdallah al-Senussi for crimes against humanity.¹²⁹

As it stands in April 2013, military intervention in Syria lacks legitimate authority. The UNSC is unable to pass a resolution. China and Russia have vetoed all draft resolutions, claiming that the resolutions are unbalanced and fail to condemn the regime and the opposition equally. They believe that the West is intent on regime change and are attempting to use R2P as the excuse to make it happen.¹³⁰

Proportional Means: Intervention must only last as long and be as intense as necessary to provide humanitarian assistance. Intervention in Libya under *UNSCR 1973* became contentious after it transitioned to regime change. The coalition defended their actions by explaining that the only way to defend the population was to remove Qadhafi. If he were to remain in place then civilians would continue to be in danger. After the conflict, the

¹²⁷ Masters, Jonathan, "Syria's Crisis and the Global Response," Council on Foreign Relations (3 Apr 2013) <http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisis-global-response/p28402> (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

¹²⁸ Leiby, Richard, Mansour, Muhammad, "Arab League Asks U.N. for No-Fly Zone Over Libya," *The Washington Post* (12 Mar 2012) http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-12/world/35208628_1_arab-league-gaddafi-moussa (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

¹²⁹ Coalition for the International Criminal Court, "Cases & Situations > Libya," <http://www.iccnw.org/?mod=libya> (accessed 9 Apr 2013).

¹³⁰ Zifcak, Spencer, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria," *Melbourne Journal of International Law* Vol. 13 (2012) p83.

UNSC passed *Resolution 2009* that established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). UNSMIL was authorized to assist the Libyans in restoring public security and establishing a new government.¹³¹ This criterion of proportional means does not yet apply to Syria.

Reasonable Prospect: Military intervention must not cause more harm than good, in other words, the success of military intervention should, as much as possible, be certain. Libya was a pariah state and had few, if any, allies. Since Qadhafi took control of Libya in a coup he has feared the same fate. This can be seen in the way he kept his military weak, and instead employed foreign mercenaries and maintained a robust regime protection force. His military was quick to defect and were no match for a NATO-backed opposition.

The Libyan rebels also had a plan to govern after the fall of Qadhafi. The opposition was recognized early on in the conflict as the “legitimate authority of the Libyan people” in the guise of their political wing, the National Transitional Council (NTC). The armed opposition was united in their cause to topple Qadhafi. The NTC and the united opposition allowed the UN to conduct air operations and then leave the transitional government to their own devices, albeit with some international support.

Unlike Libya, a reasonable prospect of a successful intervention may not exist in Syria. Besides Russian political support, the Iranians have trained the militia being deployed against the populace and Syrian opposition. They are well armed and loyal. The regime also maintains a large stockpile of chemical weapons that are dispersed

¹³¹ United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Creates United Nations Support Mission in Libya Adopting Resolution 2009 (2011),” (16 Sep 2011) <https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10389.doc.htm> (accessed 9 Apr 2011).

throughout the country. If the regime were backed into a corner it is not certain if they would use the weapons on their people. There is also a fear that the conflict could turn into an ethnic one, and the international community will not look good supporting one side against the other, if a Libyan style intervention were authorized.

Unlike the Libyan opposition, the Syrian opposition is fractured. There are multiple groups that would like to be the ultimate voice of authority once the Syrian regime is gone. There is no one group that has the backing of the Syrian people that the United Nations or international community could back. The main armed faction, the Free Syrian Army operates in Syria, but the leadership issues orders from refugee camps in Turkey. Additionally, the opposition is largely Sunni which has the potential of creating conflict on ethnic grounds when fighting the Alawite/Shiite regime. There are also elements of Islamic extremists in the Syrian opposition; in fact, one of the key armed groups has been designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization. It will be hard to support an armed opposition that lacks unity of command. With all this considered, providing an avenue for the opposition to defeat the Syrian government may hurt the people more than by allowing the events to play themselves out on the ground.

Conclusion

As the case study describes, the key difference between the situations in Libya and Syria is that the United Nations Security Council was able to pass a resolution authorizing armed intervention in Libya. This gave the intervention *legitimate authority* as described by ICISS. In Syria, Russia and China have successfully blocked any Western effort to implement a multilateral humanitarian intervention. This alone will prevent a “legal” armed humanitarian intervention from ever taking place in Syria. It

also underscores the continued selective nature of humanitarian intervention, despite the United Nation's best efforts to make it otherwise.

Arguably, the intervention in Libya can be blamed for the failure to meet both the *right intention* and *legitimate authority* criteria in Syria. After NATO stretched the *right intention* criterion to its limits in Libya, it will not be able to convince the UNSC that regime change is not the NATO mission in Syria. This is one of the primary reasons Russia and China will not allow a resolution to pass the council, which removes the possibility of *legitimate authority*. It is also not in Russia's best interest to allow intervention in Syria, as this would disrupt the status quo and endanger its access to the Middle East and Mediterranean Ocean.

Another difference between the two conflicts is that the Libyan regime had a fractured military and limited external support which gave military intervention a *reasonable prospect* of success. Also assisting the criterion of *reasonable prospect* is the fact that the Libyan opposition had an interim government ready to govern once Qadhafi was deposed. In contrast, the Syrian regime has allies that are actively supporting it, and the opposition forces are ideologically fractured. The uncertainty of the outcome of armed humanitarian intervention also limits the *reasonable prospect* criteria. It is unknown how the Iranians, Hizballah, and even the Russians will react to an armed humanitarian intervention. Intervention may cause more harm than good, creating the potential for a regional or global conflict. Additionally, there is the "moral hazard" of intervention, the act of the rebellion/opposition to provoke the regime to commit atrocities to encourage the international community to intervene. In this case, the promise of humanitarian intervention causes unintentional harm to the population of the

country in strife.¹³² If intervention occurs and succeeds in helping the rebels it encourages other rebellions elsewhere, creating a cycle of violence.

In summary, the situation in Syria has continued to escalate for more than two years; there is the possibility that the al-Asad regime has used chemical weapons against the rebellion and civilians.¹³³ If true, this would be a war crime and make it exceedingly difficult for the international community to stand by and not intervene. Israel has already conducted unilateral air strikes on Syrian targets, challenging Israeli allies to justify the *right intention* for multilateral humanitarian intervention since the actions were not taken to protect the Syrian people.¹³⁴ Action in Syria may have to be conducted under the auspices of preventive war instead of “Responsibility to Protect.”¹³⁵ If intervention is to take place in Syria, it will likely be implemented unilaterally as it was in Kosovo.

“Responsibility to Protect” is an idealistic concept that if wholly enacted would hold rogue states accountable for their actions and would likely prevent atrocities. However, as it stands, and as this chapter demonstrates, national interests will dictate whether or not intervention is implemented. Failure of the UNSC to approve intervention in the case of proven genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity is a failure of R2P. Accepting the ICISS proposed criteria for armed intervention as a

¹³² Kuperman, Alan J., “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons From the Balkans,” *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 52 (2008) p49-50.

¹³³ Roberts, Dan, “Syria Chemical Weapons Evidence ‘Too Degraded’ for Proof,” *The Guardian*, (2 May 2013) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/02/us-uk-syria-chemical-weapons-claims> (accessed 5 May 2013).

¹³⁴ Muir, Jim, “Israeli Strikes on Syria ‘Co-ordinated with Terrorists’,” *BBC*, (5 May 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22419995> (accessed 5 May 2013).

¹³⁵ Preventive War is an attack against a possible enemy to prevent an attack at a later time or shift in the strategic balance by that enemy.

Gray, Colin, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration,” *The Strategic Studies Institute*, 2007, p v-vi <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub789.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2013).

legal framework may be a step closer in holding the UNSC accountable to its responsibility to protect.

CHAPTER 3: Libya's Civil Resistance Movements: From Arab Spring to Constitution

Libya's Arab Spring revolution originated the same way as Egypt and Tunisia's uprisings, with countrywide nonviolent protests calling for regime change. However, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Libya's revolution quickly turned violent and morphed into a six month bloody civil war that culminated in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention and the killing of Libya's leader, Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi.¹³⁶ Nonviolent resistance was present in all three country's conflicts, with the difference being that nonviolent resistance alone was effective in the removal of the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders, while this was not the case in Libya. This raises the question, what was the effectiveness of the Libyan civil resistance in the overthrow of Qadhafi and in the aftermath of conflict?

Despite the fact that the armed rebellion received the most attention from the media, nonviolent resistance movements were active during the conflict. This chapter argues that Libyan civil resistance movements were instrumental in the fall of the regime, particularly in attacking two elements of Qadhafi's perceived sources of power, namely, control of the media/communications and the loyalty of the people within Libya's capital, Tripoli. The question posed above will be answered by identifying the strategies of effective civil resistance movements and analyzing their adaptation in Libyan nonviolent movements. This chapter will examine the role, evolution, and success of civil resistance leading-up to and during Libya's civil war, and conclude with an analysis of the

¹³⁶ Cutler, David, "Timeline – Arab Spring: A Year that Shook the Arab World," *Reuters* (January 14, 2012) <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/tunisia-revolution-anniversary-idINDEE80C0IT20120113> (accessed 14 December 2013).

contributions of nonviolent movements in the transition of post-Qadhafi Libya to democracy (which is still ongoing).

Nonviolent movements have a democratizing effect, primarily due to their requirement of mass mobilization and encouragement of participation. This is important to the post-conflict role of Libyan civil resistance. Qadhafi took power in 1969 during a military coup which deposed King Idris al-Sanussi.¹³⁷ In order to solidify his dictatorship, he implemented Law 71 in 1972, which made illegal any political activity that was ideologically opposed to his movement.¹³⁸ An article of that law imposed the death penalty on anyone that “joined, formed, or supported any such [opposition] group.”¹³⁹ Law 71 essentially outlawed dissent and the development of civil society. As a result, the Libyan people, had no understanding of what democracy was; they had not been allowed to choose their leaders in 42 years. This has drastically changed in post-Qadhafi Libya, where nonviolent movements have taken the responsibility for keeping the spirit of the revolution alive; namely by representing the people’s grievances to the government, conducting training in the practice of democracy, and fighting corruption.

First, however, it is important to define civil resistance and concepts and tactics in nonviolent movements that have been used from Gandhi to the Serbian student activists of Otpor! (Serbian for resistance). This will provide a basis for the analysis of the Libyan civil resistance.

¹³⁷ Davis, Brian, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya*, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990) pg 2.

¹³⁸ Human Rights Watch, “US/Libya: Rice Should Press Tripoli to Improve Rights,” <http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/01/uslibya-rice-should-press-tripoli-improve-rights> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

Civil Resistance

Civil resistance is a form of political action that relies on non-violent methods.¹⁴⁰ Throughout the chapter civil resistance will be used interchangeably with “nonviolent action” and “nonviolent movement.” This should not be confused with nonviolence due to a philosophical pacifism. While nonviolence or pacifism is generally thought of as “the refusal to bear arms on moral or religious grounds,” “‘nonviolent action’ is a technique of waging conflicts and is identified by the type of action employed.”¹⁴¹ The nonviolent nature of the conflict allows mass mobilization of the population and encourages participation. In other words, civil resistance is a type of asymmetric warfare that enables the whole population to effectively participate in one form or another.

Much has been written on nonviolent strategy and how “people power” can be used to force changes in government policy, end military occupations, and even overthrow dictatorships. Perhaps, the most comprehensive works are those written by nonviolent theorist/strategist Gene Sharp, who is often considered the “Godfather of nonviolent resistance.”¹⁴² Many consider Sharp’s three-volume *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973) as the “theoretical foundation” for modern civil resistance.¹⁴³ Gene Sharp’s book, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for*

¹⁴⁰ Roberts, Adam, Ash, Timothy Garton, “Definition of ‘civil resistance’,” *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*, (Oxford University Press, 2009) http://cis.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/civ_res/CivRes_Definition_Jul09.pdf (accessed 1 March 2014).

¹⁴¹ Merriam-Webster, “pacifism,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pacifism> (accessed 15 March 2014).

Albert Einstein Institution, “What is the difference between “nonviolent action” and “nonviolence?” *Frequently Asked Questions*, <http://www.aeinstein.org/faqs/> (accessed 15 March 2014).

¹⁴² Peterson, Scott, “Iran Protesters: The Harvard Professor Behind Their Tactics,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, (December 29, 2009) <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1229/Iran-protesters-the-Harvard-professor-behind-their-tactics> (accessed 15 March 2014).

¹⁴³ Chenoweth, Erica, Stephan, Maria J., *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press 2011), pg 21. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* was first published in 1973.

Liberation (first published in 1993), has been translated into numerous languages and is popular reading among aspiring and practicing revolutionaries throughout the world. It was used as a training manual for Otpor! during the Serbian uprising and helped to educate the Egyptian revolutionaries during the Arab Spring.

The literature describes how to develop a nonviolent resistance from the ground up, but the theories do not go into detail on nonviolent resistance in the midst of a violent conflict as was the case in Libya. This chapter will further the current literature by analyzing the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance during violent conflict and then its evolution. I will use concepts developed and theorized by Gene Sharp and other strategists to analyze the effectiveness of the Libyan civil resistance while violent conflict was in full swing. First, I will examine the concept of civil resistance, specifically in relationship to the overthrowing of a dictatorship.

Nonviolent vs. Violent Resistance

As Gene Sharp explains, dictatorship comes down to the consent of the people to obey; once the people refuse to obey the authority of the regime, its legitimacy begins to crumble.¹⁴⁴ It is important to begin our study by asking: why would a population choose nonviolent over violent resistance? There are several reasons; for one, nonviolent resistance allows mass participation. People from all walks of life can participate in civil resistance, whether it is by protest or by simply not going to work. Nonviolent resistance also allows the participants to gain the sympathy of the international community, and potentially the government and security forces they are opposing. The latter is

¹⁴⁴ Sharp, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2010), pg 19.

particularly vital when the regime has no qualms about using the security forces to suppress the nonviolent uprising.

In contrast, violent resistance only enforces the regime's narrative that it is being opposed by terrorists or by a foreign backed insurrection. It also legitimizes the use of the security forces in a violent crack-down. The government holds the monopoly on the use of force and will have the advantage over any internal violent resistance.¹⁴⁵ In other words, violent resistance may have the effect of reinforcing the loyalty of security forces, while civil resistance undermines it. According to one of the authors of *Why Civil Resistance Works*, Erica Chenoweth, "when security forces refuse orders to...fire on peaceful protesters, regimes must accommodate the opposition or give up power..."¹⁴⁶

Civil resistance has also shown to have a democratization effect; giving people a way to defend their newly won liberties and to keep elected leadership on notice.¹⁴⁷ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan's conducted exhaustive research to determine the overall success of civil resistance over violent resistance. Besides finding that nonviolent movements did have more of a chance of victory than violent ones, they found that where civil resistance was successful there was also a better chance of democracy following the end of the conflict.¹⁴⁸ This is largely due to the mass participation that civil resistance allows. Gene Sharp also listed several reasons for the democratization effect of civil resistance: experience in civil resistance may make the people confident in pursuing it

¹⁴⁵ Munro, Andre "State Monopoly on Violence," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, (June 3, 2013) <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1916738/state-monopoly-on-violence> (accessed 1 March 2014).

¹⁴⁶ Chenoweth, Erica, "Give Peaceful Resistance a Chance," *The New York Times* (March 10, 2011).

¹⁴⁷ Sharp, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2010), pg 37.

¹⁴⁸ Chenoweth, Erica, Stephan, Maria J., *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press 2011), pg 201-203.

again; civil resistance can be used to exercise free speech and free press in face of governmental repression; civil resistance contributes to the development of civil society; and civil resistance provides an avenue by which the people can counter repressive security forces.¹⁴⁹

Civil resistance requires mass mobilization and organization, however, in the face of all-out war, it must remain covert and smaller in order to protect the participants. Small acts of defiance and civil disobedience are the best ways for a group to make their voices heard and to be able to escape without being discovered. Tactics may include noncooperation, strikes, graffiti and other symbolic gestures.¹⁵⁰ There are several methods that a nonviolent movement can select in order to confront an oppressive regime.¹⁵¹ As will be discussed in the case study, civil resistance during the Libyan conflict was a combination of civil resistance and active support to the armed rebellion. In these ways, civilians were able to participate in the armed conflict and the overthrow of Qadhafi without picking up a weapon.

Strategy

As with any form of conflict, in order for nonviolent resistance to be successful there must be a coherent strategy. A strategy will determine the time, place, method, and the reason for conducting nonviolent conflict.¹⁵² This section will examine several of the

¹⁴⁹ Sharp, Gene *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2010), pg 37-38.

¹⁵⁰ Barter, Shane Joshua, "Unarmed Forces: Civilian Strategy in Violent Conflicts," *Peach & Change: A Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (October 2012), pg 544 -571.

¹⁵¹ Sharp, Gene, "198 Methods of Nonviolent Action," *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973) Albert Einstein Institution.

¹⁵² Sharp, Gene, *Self-Liberation: A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or Other Oppression*, (Boston: 2009) Albert Einstein Institution, pg 19.

key strategies and elements of nonviolent resistance that will later be used to analyze civil resistance in Libya.

Unity, Strategic Planning, and Nonviolent Discipline: Activist scholars agree that there are three essential attributes to a successful nonviolent movement: unity, planning, and nonviolent discipline.¹⁵³ The Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS)¹⁵⁴ *Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle* breaks unity into three different categories: unity of people, the necessary participation of a diverse group of people to keep the movement legitimate; unity within the organization, having an appropriate leadership structure; and unity of purpose, the need for consensus in establishing goals.¹⁵⁵ Strategic planning is extremely important to keep the direction of the movement on course and to devise what tactics and methods to use and when to use them.

The third attribute, nonviolent discipline is crucial to the success of civil resistance. As mentioned previously, nonviolence promotes mass participation. Most people will not join or do not have the skills to join an armed resistance. As also noted, nonviolence de-legitimizes the opponent if he were to resort to violent repression and leads to the possibility of gaining the sympathy of the opponent's supporters.¹⁵⁶ Once a movement becomes violent it gives the regime the excuse it needs to use violence in return. Lack of nonviolent discipline essentially undermines the legitimacy of the movement.

¹⁵³ Merriman, Hardy, "The Trifecta of Civil Resistance: Unity, Planning, Discipline," *openDemocracy*, (November 19, 2010).

¹⁵⁴ CANVAS is an NGO founded by the Serbian youth resistance movement Otpor! Which played an important role in deposing Milosevic in 2000. More information can be found on their website <http://www.canvasopedia.org/>.

¹⁵⁵ Srdja Popovic, Slobodan Djindjic, Andrej Milivojevic, Hardy Merriman and Ivan Marovic, *CANVAS Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle*, (Serbia: CANVAS 2007), pg 86-89.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

In many conflicts against dictatorships, such as in Libya, nonviolent discipline may be lost and violence unavoidable, however civil resistance is still possible. Under these violent circumstances, Gene Sharp prescribes that nonviolent action must be separate from the violent action, whether by geography or issue. If this is not done, then there is a risk that the violent action will overshadow the nonviolent action and sabotage its chance of success.¹⁵⁷

There are many elements of developing a strategy for a nonviolent movement and these elements will provide the best way to analyze the Libyan civil resistance during the conflict. In *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler define twelve principles in three different categories in developing a strategy. The categories are: Principles of Development, Principles of Engagement, and Principles of Conception.¹⁵⁸ Here, I will focus on the Principles of Engagement. The principles within this category are to attack the opponents' strategy for consolidating control, mute the impact of the opponents' violent weapons, alienate opponents from bases of support, and maintain nonviolent discipline.¹⁵⁹ These concepts are further articulated for the activist by Gene Sharp and Robert Helvey in the discussion below.

Sources of Power: Gene Sharp identified six sources of power that explain what a dictatorship such as Libya needs to maintain its rule. They are: (1) authority, "belief among the people the regime is legitimate...;" (2) human resources, "number and importance of the persons and groups which are obeying...;" (3) skills and knowledge,

¹⁵⁷ Sharp, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2010), pg 33.

¹⁵⁸ Ackerman, Peter, Kruegler, Christopher, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, (Conneticut: Praeger Publishers 1994), pg 22.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, pg 23.

“needed by the regime to perform specific actions and supplied by the cooperating persons...,” (4) intangible factors, “psychological and ideological factors...,” (5) material resources, “rulers control or access to property, natural resources, financial resources,...means of communication and transportation;” and (6) sanctions, “punishments, threatened or applied,...to ensure submission and cooperation...”¹⁶⁰

These elements of power are dependent on the obedience of the people and if that obedience were withdrawn, as mentioned previously, the regime might begin to crumble.¹⁶¹

Pillars of Support: There are also elements of support that the regime depends on to remain in power. These elements are known as the “pillars of support.”¹⁶² The pillars are institutions and organizations, such as the police, military, civil servants, media, business community, youth, workers, religious organizations, and non-governmental organizations.¹⁶³ While developing a strategic plan a nonviolent movement will study the regime’s pillars of support and develop tactics to undermine them. Once a pillar is toppled the regime is also closer to falling.

Methods: There are many nonviolent methods or tactics that have been developed to use against the regime. Gene Sharp identified 198 methods of nonviolent action. They are separated by category: nonviolent protest and persuasion, social noncooperation, economic noncooperation: boycotts, economic noncooperation: the strike, political

¹⁶⁰ Sharp, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2010), pg 18-19.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pg 19.

¹⁶² Helvey, Robert L., *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About Fundamentals* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2004), pg 9.

¹⁶³ Ibid., pg 9-18.

noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.¹⁶⁴ The methods are provided as ideas and the best method must be chosen for the situation; the idea is for the movement to remain creative and diverse in its tactics.

Two major ideas of nonviolent action are to create a “dilemma action” for the opponent and to exploit the outcome of that action to create “backfire” that will put the opponent in a negative light. Gene Sharp referred to this as “political jiu-jitsu” or, in other words, to use the opponent’s own actions against him.¹⁶⁵

Dilemma Action: A dilemma action is a proactive well planned act that “places the opponent in a situation where any response made will result in a negative outcome for the opponent.”¹⁶⁶ In the case of Libya, Qadhafi was faced with countrywide protests. He could either let them happen or try to repress them with the security forces. Activist Philippe Duhamel best explains dilemma action in relation to the activist: “...if the action is allowed to go forward, it accomplishes something worthwhile...If the power holders repress the action, they put themselves in a bad light, and the public is educated about the issue or position.”¹⁶⁷ It is a win-win for the activist. Qadhafi chose to use violent repression of the protests in order to avoid a situation similar to Egypt and Tunisia. His choice “backfired,” which ultimately resulted in war, international intervention, and his death.

¹⁶⁴ Sharp, Gene, “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action,” *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973) Albert Einstein Institution.

¹⁶⁵ Sharp, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2010), pg 33.

¹⁶⁶ Srdja Popovic, Andrej Milivojevic and Slobodan Djindjic, *Nonviolent Struggle: 50 Crucial Points* (Serbia: CANVAS 2006), pg 70.

Sorensen, Majken Jul, Martin, Brian, “The Dilemma Action: Analysis of an Activist Technique,” (to appear in *Peace & Change*, 2014), <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/preprints/da121212.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2014).

¹⁶⁷ Duhamel, Philippe, “The Dilemma Demonstration: Using Nonviolent Civil Disobedience to put the Government Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” *A Tactical Notebook* (Minnesota: New Tactics Project of the Center for Victims of Torture 2004).

Backfire: Creating a backfire is the objective of the dilemma action. In reference to “political jiu-jitsu,” Gene Sharp described it as:

...the stark brutality of the regime against the clearly nonviolent actionists politically rebounds against the dictators’ position, causing dissension in their own ranks as well as fomenting support for the resisters among the general population, the regime’s usual supporters, and third parties.¹⁶⁸

Activist and scholar Brian Martin furthered the concept of backfire by developing a model to create it. The model can be summed up in the two conditions for backfire, which are the perception that an action is “unjust, unfair, excessive or disproportional” and the action is made public with an emphasis on its injustice.¹⁶⁹

This brings about another argument that perhaps nonviolent movements are inherently violent due to the fact that they are trying to create a violent reaction from their opponent.¹⁷⁰ Dilemma action and backfire are used by revolutionaries throughout the world to gain sympathy and delegitimize authoritarian and reactionary dictatorships.

Although these strategies seem to be focused on civil resistance as the sole form of conflict against a dictator, they can also be applied to the civil resistance movements that are active within a violent conflict against a dictator, as in Libya. In order for the nonviolent movements to be successful they must ensure that they remain separate from the violent groups. They can be separated by location or issue. Besides a long-term common goal, there should be no way for the regime to

¹⁶⁸ Sharp, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Albert Einstein Institution: 2010), pg 33.

¹⁶⁹ Martin, Brian, “Backfire Basics,” *Backfire Materials* (2005) <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/bf/bfbasics.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2014).

¹⁷⁰ Ginsberg, Benjamin, “Why Violence Works,” *Chronicle of Higher Education* August 16, 2013, Vol. 59 Issue 45, p B6-B9.

connect the two. If not separated, the nonviolent movement will be consumed by the violent one. The nonviolent movement will need to maintain unity, nonviolent discipline, and have a sound strategy to conduct successful operations in an environment where the dictator is already committed to a violent war.

Case Study

To judge the effectiveness of Libyan civil resistance in overthrowing Qadhafi, I will examine specific nonviolent movements that were active during the conflict and their ability to target the regime's pillars of support. I will specifically look at the concepts of dilemma action and backfire in relation to the named movements. Finally, I will examine the democratizing effect that the Libyan civil resistance plays post-conflict as the country attempts to transition from a dictatorship.

The role of Libyan civil resistance can be separated by events: Revolution (Day of Rage to the death of Qadhafi on 20 October 2011) and Post-Qadhafi. As mentioned, I will look at both timeframes.

Revolution

Day of Rage: I will begin our discussion with the *Day or Rage* protests which offer an excellent example of dilemma action and backfire. The mass protests were organized in an attempt to replicate the results of the Tunisia and Egypt protests. The organizers chose February 17, 2011 as the day the protests would begin in Benghazi and several other eastern Libyan cities. The date was chosen to commemorate the Prophet Muhammad cartoon protests that took place on the same

date in 2006, where security forces killed 11 protesters.¹⁷¹ However, the 2011 protests started two days early, after Fathi Tarbel, one of the lead protest organizers, was arrested.¹⁷²

The protests began in Benghazi on February 15, and by February 17 they had quickly spread to cities and villages throughout the country. The Libyan government enacted Law 71 and began to violently crackdown on the protests. The most inactive city was the capital, Tripoli, which was kept under strict control with mass arrests of activists, control of the internet, and small pro-regime demonstrations.¹⁷³ The protests continued for several days before the opposition forces picked up weapons to fight the regime, eliminating the possibility of a completely nonviolent revolution.

There are several arguments on why the *Day of Rage* protests lost nonviolent discipline. It might have been due to a lack of unity, strategic planning or their lack of clearly established and communicated end-state.¹⁷⁴ Its early start was spontaneous, instead of as a desired well-coordinated mass mobilization of Libyan citizens. Gene Sharp even proposed a theory that one of the high-level military defectors from the Qadhafi regime was an agent provocateur offering weapons to the rebels, which they accepted.¹⁷⁵

Whatever the reason for the failure of the *Day of Rage* protests, it did achieve several objectives that would prove beneficial to the opposition. Perhaps most

¹⁷¹ CNN.com, "In Libya, 11 reportedly Die in Cartoon Protests," (February 18, 2006) <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/02/17/libya.cartoons/> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁷² Staff Writers, "Libya 'Day of Rage' Kicks Off," *afrol News* (February 17, 2011) <http://www.afrol.com/articles/37348> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Chenoweth, Erica, "Backfire in the Arab Spring," *Middle East Institute* (September 1, 2011) <http://www.mei.edu/content/backfire-arab-spring> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁷⁵ Spencer, Metta, "Gene Sharp's Ideas are Breaking Through," *Peace Magazine* (Jan/Mar 2012) pg 8-12.

importantly, the protests caused mass participation. Despite the violent crackdowns, the protesters overwhelmed the security forces, pushing them out of many cities. Benghazi, the origin of the revolution, became a safe-haven for the opposition where it was able to create an alternative government. Additionally, many key Libyan government officials, military, and ambassadors abroad, resigned or defected in response to the violence used against the protesters.¹⁷⁶ In other words, the actions of the regime backfired and resulted in domestic and international condemnation and led to the resulting civil-war and ultimately, the fall of the government.

Pillar of Support - Control of the Media and Communication

Before and during the conflict, the Libyan government controlled all forms of media and communication, from television to the internet. Even if people had access to the internet, they seldom used it due to fear of being monitored and arrested if they were perceived to be anti-establishment.¹⁷⁷ By exerting control over communication, Qadhafi was able to maintain the narrative that the protesters and rebels were “cockroaches,” while the majority of Libyans were loyal to the regime.¹⁷⁸ The control of the narrative/message kept the disparate villages and cities separate, making it difficult to coordinate actions. The control of communication was a key pillar of support.

The government’s tight control also meant that the only news that the international community would hear about the uprising was controlled by the State. International journalists were not allowed to go to Benghazi, and in Tripoli, they were

¹⁷⁶ Chenoweth, Erica, “Backfire in the Arab Spring,” *Middle East Institute* (September 1, 2011) <http://www.mei.edu/content/backfire-arab-spring> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁷⁷ Freedom House, “Libya,” *Freedom on the Net*, (2012) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁷⁸ Gardner, Frank, “Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit,” (February 22, 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624> (accessed 14 December 2013).

kept in the Rixos Hotel, where they were given statements by the government.¹⁷⁹ This made control of media and all communication extremely important and one of the pillars of support of Qadhafi's power. If this pillar fell, he would lose control of the narrative and his influence over the people.

Providing awareness of the situation to the international community became the primary role of the civil resistance. The most active and organized movements came from the Libyan diaspora. There were several groups, but arguably, the one that had the most impact was the Libyan Youth Movement or "Shabab Libya."

Libyan Youth Movement: The Libyan Youth Movement (LYM) formed in January 2011 as a Facebook page and then a Twitter account on February 5. Their goal was to "unite the Libyan youth both inside and out of Libya in preparation for the February 17 [*Day of Rage*] uprising."¹⁸⁰ However, after the conflict began they became a source of accurate and reliable information for people and news agencies to hear what was happening on the ground.

The government was able to block the internet; however, it did so slowly, not shutting everything down at once. The opposition secured internet access in the east (Benghazi); however, the west was quiet.¹⁸¹ LYM anticipated the media and communication blackout and set up a database of contacts in order to pass information from areas of activity in real time.¹⁸² LYM was administered by Libyan diaspora in

¹⁷⁹ Sherwood, Harriet, "Libya Conflict: Journalists Trapped in Tripoli's Rixos Hotel," *The Guardian*, (August 24, 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/24/libya-journalists-trapped-tripoli-hotel> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁸⁰ *Shabab Libya: Libyan Youth Movement*, "About," <http://www.shabablibya.org/about> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁸¹ Freedom House, "Libya," *Freedom on the Net*, (2012) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/libya> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁸² *Shabab Libya: Libyan Youth Movement*, "About," <http://www.shabablibya.org/about> (accessed 14 December 2013).

Canada and the United Kingdom, who used networks of friends and family in Libya to pass them situation reports. The group would then post this information on their website or Tweet it to the media. It was often the case that the LYM would act as a conduit between the journalists and the people on the ground witnessing actions. They also would fact check international reporting to verify its accuracy.¹⁸³

During the conflict, LYM was well organized and acted professionally, earning a reputation as a legitimate news source, from inside a country that was virtually blocked to the outside world. In this role, it developed a set of journalistic guidelines for “breaking barriers and getting the news out.”¹⁸⁴ These guidelines included:

- Don't rely on news from other sources, get your own sources.
- Verify the information twice even if it likely to be true. Gaddafi's son Khamis has died five times!
- Use the phone and talk in person when you can. Rely on first-hand witnesses as much as possible.
- Don't post news that is not confirmed by reliable sources. You might miss out on a scoop but you are maintaining your reputation.
- Building a reputation takes time. Work hard, be patient and committed.
- Get a good communication system in place for those working abroad. You will use your phone network and the Internet more than anything else; you'll need reliable service where you work.
- Lots of people will disagree with what you say. Be open to criticism and accept differences of opinion.
- Building a good reputation with international media organizations takes time and hard work; don't give up and don't expect to be on CNN the first week.
- Back up your work. Expect cyber-attacks on your website; you may have to re-upload materials online.¹⁸⁵

The success of LYM in raising awareness of the plight of the Libyan people broke Qadhafi's control of the media and subsequently his control of the narrative. LYM

¹⁸³ Priyanka, “A Liberated Libya Exclusive: Interview with Co-Founder of the Libyan Youth Movement, Ayat Mneina,” *Priyanka Mogul* (February 21, 2012) <http://priyankamogul.com/2012/02/21/youth-libyan-movement/> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁸⁴ al-Abdallah, Mohammad, “How a Volunteer News Brigade Broke through Libya's Internet Blackout,” *ijnet* (July 12, 2011) <http://ijnet.org/blog/how-volunteer-news-brigade-broke-libyas-internet-blackout> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

provides an excellent example of how nonviolent civil resistance plays an effective part in a revolution and makes an impact internationally. Their coverage of the violence committed against unarmed protesters and civilians may have created the backfire that led to the NATO intervention and the eventual collapse of the Qadhafi regime.

The two conditions for creating a backfire in nonviolent conflict are present when an action is seen as excessive or disproportional vis-a-vis a nonviolent challenge and when that action becomes public knowledge.¹⁸⁶ In the case of Libya, the excessive action was the regime's use of excessive force on nonviolent protesters. The LYM made that action public by alerting the international media and keeping the world informed.

Pillar of Support - Control of Tripoli

Control of the capital was key for Qadhafi and the regime's survivability, as the final bastion of power. If it appeared that he lost control of Tripoli, then it would significantly bolster the rebellion, and he would most likely face more defections and uprisings. Thus, control of Tripoli became a second critical pillar of support for Qadhafi's power. Without a secure base from which to operate, Qadhafi's rule was at an end. If this pillar could be toppled, then the opposition would essentially have control of all of Libya's population centers.

Qadhafi exercised control in Tripoli as the revolution and resistance grew by shutting down the internet, conducting mass arrests of suspected dissenters, deploying and paying civilians to act as informants, and demanding extra-judicial killings.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Martin, Brian, "Backfire Basics," *Backfire Materials* (2005) <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/bf/bfbasics.pdf> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁸⁷ Peterson, Scott, "How a Daring Band of anti-Qaddafi Activists Helped Turn the Tide in Tripoli," *The Christian Science Monitor* (October 21, 2011) <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1021/How-a-daring-band-of-anti-Qaddafi-activists-helped-turn-the-tide-in-Tripoli> (accessed 14 December 2013).

Through his control of the media he attempted to have the rest of the country and world believe that Tripoli remained loyal to the government. However, resistance movements were at work within the city. Some were violent and employed guerilla tactics, while others continued to maintain nonviolent discipline.¹⁸⁸ The most publicized nonviolent civil resistance group within Tripoli was the Free Generation Movement.

Free Generation Movement: The Free Generation Movement (FGM) was founded by Nizar Mhani, a Libyan who had spent the last decade in Wales, but returned at the outset of the revolution. He organized his family and friends to begin conducting “peaceful covert acts of defiance.”¹⁸⁹ FGM’s goal was to keep morale up in Tripoli, to keep the spirit of the revolution alive, and most importantly, to demonstrate to the rest of the country and the international community that there was resistance ongoing within the capital.¹⁹⁰

FGM conducted creative and diverse acts of civil disobedience that put them on Qadhafi’s most wanted list because of their effectiveness. All FGM operations were filmed and uploaded to the internet and sent to the journalists who were “imprisoned” in the Rixos Hotel. If they couldn’t get internet access the video was passed hand to hand. FGM organized a small demonstration inside Tripoli during early morning hours to avoid observation. They painted the colors of the revolution on one of the main highways through the city, released pigeons with opposition flags tied to their legs, hung an

¹⁸⁸ Gopal, Anand, “The Tripoli Uprising,” *Foreign Policy* (September 1, 2011) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/01/the_tripoli_uprising#sthash.j9B1Q8S3.dpbs (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁸⁹ Kofman, Jeffrey, “Resistance in Tripoli: Risking Life with Covert Acts of Defiance,” *ABC News* (June 2, 2011) <http://abcnews.go.com/International/anti-gadhafi-activists-movement-libya-underground/story?id=13746119> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁹⁰ Devine, Darren, “Wales Online: Cardiff-based Libyan Revolutionary Nizar Mhani on his Hopes for Homeland’s Future,” *The Free Generation Movement* (January 30, 2012) <http://fgmovement.org/archives/1648> (accessed 14 December 2013).

oversized opposition flag off of an overpass, and burnt a billboard with the picture of Qadhafi on it.¹⁹¹ FGM placed battery powered speakers in garbage bags, which they then placed around neighborhoods. At a set time, they played the old (pre-Qadhafi) national anthem in a loop.¹⁹² Probably one of the most meaningful tactics was the filming of the “Voices of Tripoli,” in which they filmed people at well-known places in Tripoli speaking out against the regime.¹⁹³ These acts of civil disobedience had several effects. They lifted the morale of the increasingly concerned population of Tripoli, annoyed regime forces, and because they were filmed, they communicated to the rest of the country that resistance was alive in Tripoli.

Mhani was able to broadcast FGM’s escapades on the internet and deliver them to the international media. Although Qadhafi had shut-down the internet, one of Mhani’s family members was able to hack into the government intranet and used it to access a government satellite dish. When these revolutionaries believed they were about to get caught, they posed as repairmen, removed the satellite dish and set it up at one of their safe houses.¹⁹⁴ FGM was also very active on Twitter, keeping the media and international community aware of the situation in the capital.

¹⁹¹ *France 24*, “Libya: Underground Activists Try to Resist in Tripoli,” (May 11, 2011) <http://www.france24.com/en/20110511-2011-05-11-1140-wb-en-webnews> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁹² Kofman, Jeffrey, “Resistance in Tripoli: Risking Life with Covert Acts of Defiance,” *ABC News* (June 2, 2011) <http://abcnews.go.com/International/anti-gadhafi-activists-movement-libya-underground/story?id=13746119> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁹³ Peterson, Scott, “How a Daring Band of anti-Qaddafi Activists Helped Turn the Tide in Tripoli,” *The Christian Science Monitor* (October 21, 2011) <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1021/How-a-daring-band-of-anti-Qaddafi-activists-helped-turn-the-tide-in-Tripoli> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁹⁴ Devine, Darren, “Wales Online: Cardiff-based Libyan Revolutionary Nizar Mhani on his Hopes for Homeland’s Future,” *The Free Generation Movement* (January 30, 2012) <http://fgmovement.org/archives/1648> (accessed 14 December 2013).

FGM was extremely effective in countering Qadhafi's narrative in Tripoli, threatening the second pillar. The group understood the importance and potential that resistance had within the city and to the rest of the country. The knowledge that there was an active resistance in Tripoli gave the opposition in the East hope that they would be able to take the city and overthrow the dictator. FGM was instrumental in weakening Qadhafi's perceived control of the Tripoli pillar of support.

Post-Qadhafi Transition to Democracy

After the fall of Qadhafi in October 2011, Libya had to essentially rebuild from the ground up. Today, Libyan civil society, which was very limited under Qadhafi, is playing a large role in the transition to democracy and in post-civil war reconciliation. FGM and LYM are still active and key players in this transition. There are also many other civil society organizations that are active in raising awareness of the plight of minorities, active in attempting to disband militias, and engaging the new government.¹⁹⁵ There have been several mixed nonviolent and violent campaigns since the fall of Qadhafi. There have also been small pro-Qadhafi movements, federalism movements, and movements conducted by minorities.¹⁹⁶ Although important to rebuilding the country and transitioning to democracy, the next few sections will examine nonviolent campaigns that revolved around reconciliation, government engagement, and the disbandment of militia.

¹⁹⁵ Aliriza, Fadi, "Libya's Unarmed Revolutionaries," *Foreign Policy, Democracy Lab* (August 22, 2013) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/16/libyas_unarmed_revolutionaries#sthash.wNdqCgbd.dpb (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁹⁶ *Horizon*, "Libya: Federalism on the March – New Guard Declares Cyrenaica Government," (October 28, 2013) <http://www.hcaccess.com/?q=content/libya-federalism-march-new-guard-declares-cyrenaica-government> (accessed 14 December 2013).

Reconciliation: The Free Generation Movement's website describes three phases of Libya's progression: Resistance, Stabilization, and Development.¹⁹⁷ The first phase, according to FGM, was civil disobedience as previously mentioned, the second phase discussed humanitarian assistance and the Mafqood Project.¹⁹⁸ The Mafqood (missing) Project involves the collection of names of all the people that went missing during the conflict. The hope is that this will help to bring closure to many of the families that lost loved ones. In February 2013, the project received direct support from the United Kingdom and the International Commission for Missing Persons.¹⁹⁹

With the Mafqood Project, FGM is attempting to provide a service that the government currently does not have the capacity to fill. They continue the struggle for freedom of the Libyan people by providing the truth of what happened to their loved ones. FGM is also involved in several social awareness campaigns revolving around reconciliation, the 2012 elections, and anti-militias. In the latter campaign, they were actively demonstrating against the presence of guns in the capital. They distributed anti-gun posters throughout the city and developed a public service announcement to raise awareness of the dangers of celebratory fire.²⁰⁰

Government Engagement: The most prominent nonviolent movement to engage the interim government occurred in December 2011. Youth groups, military, and women's rights groups organized mass protests in Benghazi and in Tripoli, calling for transparency

¹⁹⁷ *The Free Generation Movement*, "Our Vision," <http://fgmovement.org/team/vision> (accessed 14 December 2013).

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ British Embassy Tripoli, "UK Announces Support for ICMP Project in Libya," *International Commission on Missing Persons* (February 6, 2013) <http://www.ic-mp.org/press-releases/uk-announces-support-for-icmp-libya/> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²⁰⁰ *The Free Generation Movement*, "No Gun Zone," <http://fgmovement.org/awareness/nogunzone> (accessed 14 December 2013).

in the National Transitional Council (NTC). The protests included a tent city in Benghazi and accusations of the NTC “stealing the revolution.”²⁰¹ The demands were for faster reforms and government transparency. They also called for former Qadhafi officials to be excluded from the new government.²⁰² The protests were effective in forcing the resignation of the Deputy Prime Minister and a promise of transparency from the interim Prime Minister.²⁰³

With the fall of the regime, Libya has to draft a new constitution and elect new leaders. Active nonviolent movements see this as the opportunity to participate in government and build a new Libya. Multiple organizations were established in 2011 to train activists in democracy and electoral processes so they could in turn educate the Libyan population. An example of this is that prior to the 2012 elections, FGM and three other groups received media training in order to produce public service announcements discussing voter education and participation in language that anyone could understand.²⁰⁴ The most active groups are youth and women; they perhaps have the most to gain with the new government.

Two groups that fit these criteria are the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace (LWPP) and H2O Team. LWPP seeks increased female participation in the Libyan

²⁰¹ Stephen, Chris, “Libyan Activists Demand Transparency from National Transitional Council,” *The Guardian* (13 December 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/13/libyan-activists-demand-transparency-ntc> (accessed 13 December 2013).

²⁰² Dittrich, Monika, “Frustration Threatens to Unleash Second Libyan Revolution,” *DW* (December 16, 2011) <http://www.dw.de/frustration-threatens-to-unleash-second-libyan-revolution/a-15600388-1> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²⁰³ *BBC*, “Libya: NTC Deputy Chief Abdel Hafiz Ghoga Resigns,” (January 22, 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16671590> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²⁰⁴ *Creative Magazine*, “Libya: Building towards Democracy through Elections,” (July 7, 2012) <http://creative-associates.us/2012/11/libya-building-towards-democracy-through-elections/> (accessed 14 December 2013).

government.²⁰⁵ They initially objected to the Election Law, which stipulated a 10% quota for women representation in government. LWPP conducted a month long campaign that was comprised of protests of various groups in the major cities and the drafting of an alternative law. LWPP was successful and achieved a guaranteed 40 seats for women in the 200 member parliament.²⁰⁶

The H2O Team is a youth group aimed at acting as a conduit between the youth and the government. Their efforts began with a campaign to increase constitutional awareness. They travelled across Libya to over 60 towns, surveying youth on what they wanted to see in the national constitution.²⁰⁷ Prior to the campaign, the team received training in constitution building, general rights and freedoms, the conducting of surveys.²⁰⁸ The surveys will be presented to parliament as suggestions and demands for new laws.

The groups mentioned above are developing networks across the disenfranchised populations of Libyan society and creating mass participation or at least mass interest in Libyan politics. The social awareness that the groups are building will make it hard for the Libyan government to change course. The Libyan example confirms Gene Sharp's theory that "the source of a ruler's power is the obedience and cooperation of the

²⁰⁵ *IPS Communicating MDG3*, "Libyan Women Plan Roles in Reconciliation and Transitional Government," <http://www.ips.org/mdg3/libyan-women-plan-roles-in-reconciliation-and-transitional-government/> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²⁰⁶ *Shabab Libya: Libyan Youth Movement*, "From 0 to 40: LWPP Advocacy Effort Secures Major Representation for Women in New Libyan Assembly," (February 9, 2012) <http://www.shabablibya.org/news/from-0-to-40-lwpp-advocacy-effort-secures-major-representation-for-women-in-new-libyan-assembly> (accessed 14 December 2013); Libyan Women's Peace Platform, "Libyan Women Call for Protest to Proposed 10% Electoral Quota," *Facebook* (January 3, 2012) https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=246712175398960&id=226081994128645 (accessed 14 December 2013).

²⁰⁷ Zaroug, Nihal, "H2O Completes Survey Phase of Constitutional Awareness Tour," *Libya Herald* (April 20, 2013) <http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/04/20/h2o-completes-survey-phase-of-constitutional-awareness-tour/#axzz2nOtkIXev> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

subjects,” without which, the ruler would cease to be the ruler.²⁰⁹ If the Libyan government were to backtrack or not meet an important demand, they could very easily face more wide scale protests.

Militia Disbandment: In response to the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, thousands of people took to the streets to protest the Ansar al-Sharia militia. The “Save Benghazi Rally” consisted of around 30,000 protesters calling for the government to criminalize militias and make revitalization of the national military and police a priority.²¹⁰ The protesters stormed three militia headquarters including Ansar al-Sharia’s, temporarily driving the militias out of the city.²¹¹

The demonstration proved the people’s intent and capability of overcoming the militias. Activists achieved a government declaration to disband the militias.²¹² However, the government is currently incapable of doing more than make threats, which militias are free to ignore. On 15 November 2013, a massive protest against militias took place in Tripoli.²¹³ The militia opened fire and killed 45 protesters creating a backfire that resulted in widespread protests and civil disobedience.²¹⁴ The demands of the

²⁰⁹ Ahlund, Anna, “Gene Sharp: The Father of Nonviolent Revolution,” *Good News Magazine* (March 11, 2013) <http://goodnewsmagazine.se/inspiration/gene-sharp-the-father-of-nonviolent-revolution/> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹⁰ *Al Jazeera*, “Protesters Seek to Disband Libya Militias,” (September 22, 2012) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/09/201292112314438851.html> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹¹ Elourfi, Asmaa, “Libyan Citizens Storm Ansar al-Sharia Base in Benghazi,” *Magharebia* (September 22, 2012) http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2012/09/22/feature-01 (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹² *Al Arabiya* with AFP, “Libya to Ban Non-state Militias, Set Up Benghazi ‘Operations Room’,” *Al Arabiya News* (September 23, 2012) <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/23/239645.html> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹³ Associated Press in Tripoli, “Libyan Militiamen Kill Protesters in Tripoli,” *The Guardian* (November 15, 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/libyan-militiamen-protesters-tripoli> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹⁴ Staff Writer, “Libya: At Least 45 Killed in Tripoli Clashes,” *Al Arabiya News* (November 15, 2013) <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2013/11/15/Militiamen-fire-on-protesters-in-Libyan-capital-AFP-.html> (accessed 14 December 2013).

protesters remain the same, for the militias to leave the cities and for the national security services to take control.

The anti-militia campaign employed several tactics and lasted from 15 – 30 November. In one protest, hundreds of women gathered to call for the militias to leave and collected signatures on a petition that stated the same demand.²¹⁵ Tripoli's local government called for a general strike until the militia left. Lufthansa cancelled all flights going into Tripoli until the strike was called off.²¹⁶ The campaign was effective in driving out several of the militias, and forced the government to deploy the military to implement security.²¹⁷ Tripoli's local government has given an ultimatum to the national government, to enact Law 27, which orders all militia to leave Tripoli by 31 December or they will resume the strike.²¹⁸

At the same time, similar protests against Islamist militias took place in Benghazi and Derna.²¹⁹ The city officials called for civil disobedience until the army was deployed and the militias had left the city. The result was a general strike of the public and private

²¹⁵ Stocker, Valerie, "Libyan Women Protest against Militia Violence," *DW* (November 20, 2013) <http://www.dw.de/libyan-women-protest-against-militia-violence/a-17240769> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹⁶ DP, "Flight or Fight? Civil Disobedience Takes on Militias in Tripoli," *Analysis Intelligence* (November 22, 2013) <http://analysisintelligence.com/geopolitics/civil-disobedience-tripoli/> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹⁷ Shennib, Ghaith, "Rival Militias Quit Tripoli, Hand Bases to Libyan Army," *Reuters* (November 22, 2013) <http://news.yahoo.com/rival-militias-quit-tripoli-hand-bases-libyan-army-065104547.html> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹⁸ Libya Herald Staff, "Tripoli General Strike Suspended," *Libya Herald* (November 30, 2013) <http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/11/30/tripoli-general-strike-suspended/#axzz2nOtkIXev> (accessed 14 December 2013).

²¹⁹ *Middle East Online*, "Benghazi Declares Civil Disobedience after Deadly Clashes," (November 26, 2013) <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=62862> (accessed 14 December 2013).

sector to include oil workers.²²⁰ The strikes have given leverage to the people to force the government to make good on their responsibility to protect the people.

Caveats

There were several factors in the fall of Qadhafi, the most obvious being civil war and international intervention. Civil resistance alone was not responsible, but, as I have argued, it did play a supporting role and without the parallel actions of the nonviolent movements the violent conflict would have been prolonged and fractured. The violent opposition was active throughout the country, but they had little in coordination and communication. The nonviolent movements discussed in the case studies were essentially enablers for the success of the violent movements.

Conclusion

As this case study demonstrates, civil resistance movements during the Libyan conflict were effective in attacking two of Qadhafi's pillars of support, which were instrumental in the fall of the regime. They broke Qadhafi's control of the media and publicized regime-committed atrocities creating a backfire effect that resulted in international intervention (albeit a violent one). A nonviolent movement was key to shattering Qadhafi's propaganda that Tripoli was loyal to the regime, it also made the rest of Libya aware that the capital was not complicit in the regime's brutality. These achievements were critical in the overall success of the revolution.

In the case of Libya, it could be argued that the armed struggle needed the civil struggle to succeed. The fighting was conducted by disparate groups that were separated

²²⁰ Shennib Ghaith, Laessing, Ulf, "Oil Workers Join Strike in Libya's Benghazi over Security," *Reuters* (November 26, 2013) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/us-libya-strike-oil-idUSBRE9AP0AM20131126> (accessed 14 December 2013).

geographically and Tripoli did not have any of the armed groups within its borders. Without the civil struggle the armed groups may not have had successful communication and coordination. They would most definitely not have had a concentrated media wing that interacted with the international community. The nonviolent movement was successful in changing the narrative of the conflict and without that the international community may not have been as receptive as it was. Without question, the concurrent armed struggle hastened the fall of Qadhafi. If the rebels had not picked up weapons and remained nonviolent, Qadhafi would have possibly fallen, but it would have been a prolonged and probably bloodier struggle.

After the fall of Qadhafi, the nonviolent movements transitioned from a war-footing to that of democracy building. As Gene Sharp discussed in the democratizing effects of civil resistance, the people have gained self-confidence and experience in holding the government accountable for its actions. They are filling roles that the government is incapable of filling and providing social services to the population. In doing so, they are encouraging mass participation from Libya's under represented populations. This will create a public that is very aware of their rights and one that possesses a willingness to hold the government accountable.

As explained in the literature review, the ideal nonviolent movement involves mass mobilization and remains widely nonviolent. Civil resistance in Libya shows that it is possible to wage a nonviolent resistance in the midst of violent conflict, which is important for countries that are currently embroiled violent conflict, like Syria. However, as discussed within the chapter the nonviolent movement must maintain nonviolent discipline and remain completely removed from the violent movement in order to keep a

sense of legitimacy. The Libyan nonviolent movements did have their advantages that other struggling countries may not enjoy, they had a vast, well-connected exile community which enabled them to work overseas, which was beneficial for encouraging mass participation without the threat of retribution and, within Libya, the fighting was separated geographically with little communication between allied groups, which enabled the nonviolent movements to operate in a somewhat isolated fashion.

It is true that the Libyan revolution was violent. It did not peacefully overthrow Qadhafi, and violence is still a part of daily life. However, nonviolent civil resistance did play an important part in the conflict and it is playing an even more important role in the transition of the government. Libyans have realized “people power” and aren’t afraid to refuse to consent to the status quo.

CONCLUSION

As of 2014, the Arab Spring revolution continues in one form or another. In Syria there is ongoing conflict, with the victors becoming more and more uncertain. In Libya the government is unable to establish rule of law, leaving a security vacuum that allows freedom of movement for terrorists and other nefarious actors. The monarchies continue to make concessions to their populations to prevent mass unrest. Arguably, the uprisings have inspired other oppressed and disenfranchised populations, leading to mass protests in China, Venezuela, and the Ukraine.

The effects of the Arab Spring will not be certain or fully evaluated for years to come. However, what is certain is that the status quo has changed. The international community has taken for granted that the regional authoritarian leadership would remain in control; maintaining stability and security. However, the populace decided they wanted a change and forced their voice to be heard, changing the political dynamic of the region. This has placed the United States in a challenging situation. Who to support...the long-time authoritarian ally or the people who seek democracy? Unfortunately, the opposition groups seeking change do not have a well thought out plan to replace the authoritarian governments, leaving much uncertainty for the international community. When considering vital national interests, in a tumultuous region, such as MENA, it is best to side with the “devil you know” than risk losing stability.

This paper has identified three concepts that could be evaluated at this early stage of the collective revolution: the relationship of the United States with the Middle Eastern monarchies, the status of “Responsibility to Protect” after the Libya intervention and lack of intervention in Syria, and civil resistance during violent conflict, as present in Libya.

Although not all-encompassing, these examinations can provide an initial understanding of the Arab Spring and how it has challenged these norms.

The relationship between the United States and the MENA countries whose leadership did not fall, the monarchies, was discerned by two factors: public opinion and a common perceived threat. Public opinion is important because it now matters in a region where it has often been ignored. This by itself can change a country's relationship with another. Particularly with an ally who was supporting the regime which was just overthrown. However, the MENA monarchies have not been overthrown, possibly because they understood the need to listen to public opinion. They will maintain control of their populations by granting concessions and allowing additional, albeit limited, freedoms. Their security concerns and their determination to maintain power will keep their relationship with the United States, for the most part unchanged.

Similarly, the United States will continue to support the monarchies, despite their questionable human rights records, because of their strategic locations and generally anti-Islamic extremist leanings. The United States will continue to provide funding and security assistance to maintain basing rights and reliable allies in the Global War on Terrorism. For the near-term, the support of the United States will enable the monarchies to quell any uprisings that were to take place. As in the Bahrain case study demonstrates, the United States is not likely to back a "democracy" seeking population if it were to endanger its strategic interests.

Strategic interests also play a role in Responsibility to Protect. The conflicts in Libya and Syria both started similarly. However, in Libya the United Nations Security Council members had no strategic interests, making it easy for them to allow an armed

intervention. In contrast, UNSC members (Russia) do have interests in Syria, causing them to object to an intervention. Responsibility to protect was designed to give the international community the responsibility to stop/prevent genocide or other atrocities without bias. In this regard, the concept of R2P essentially failed in relation to Syria.

There are other factors that contributed to the authorization of intervention in Libya and not in Syria, including a reasonable prospect of success without causing more harm than good. The Syrian regime enjoys external support from Iran. If there were an international intervention, the likelihood of causing a much larger conflict would be high. Additionally, fault lies with the opposition. It is fractured militarily, ideologically, and politically. While Libya had an interim government in place to assume leadership after Qadhafi's removal, Syrian rebels do not have a comprehensive plan for governance. However, if there were a reasonable prospect for success, it would be likely that the UNSC would continue to object due to overriding strategic interests.

One of the more fascinating aspects of the Arab Spring was that, for the most part, it was the people, by pure force of will, which changed their governments. Largely unarmed, they went face to face against armed security forces. This wasn't just mass protests as depicted on the evening news, this was a type of conflict that has been proven to undermine dictatorships across the world, and in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, their leadership was forced to step-down. Revolutionary forces in those countries were able to depose their dictators nonviolently, unlike other countries in the region.

Besides Syria, Libya was one of the more violent conflicts of the Arab Spring; however, it started nonviolently. Although the violent aspect of the conflict made the headlines and was the impetus for international intervention, there were nonviolent

movements at work. These nonviolent movements effectively played a supporting role to the armed opposition in ousting Qadhafi. They provided a conduit to the international media in a country that was heavily censored and were instrumental in breaking the perception that there was a strong Qadhafi support base within the capital. The Libyan civil resistance movements continued post-conflict to assist in reconciliation and democratizing efforts. The state of Libya today is very uncertain, but because they have developed a strong and involved civil society, there is a better chance that they may evolve into a democratic society.

The Arab Spring has changed the region, whether for the better is unknown at this time, but nonetheless the dynamic has been altered. Further study and engagement is necessary to fully understand and take advantage of the new situation. Without a good understanding of the populations' needs and their struggles, it will be difficult for the United States to develop relationships with the new leadership.

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